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NATALIE WEXLER†
INTRODUCTION 
It comes as a surprise to many—including a number of lawyers 
and law students—to learn that John Marshall was not in fact the 
country’s first Chief Justice, but rather its fourth (or, according to 
some recent scholarship, its fifth).  Before there was Marshall, there 
were John Jay, John Rutledge (briefly), possibly William Cushing (even 
more briefly), and Oliver Ellsworth.  While legal historians may be fa-
miliar with these nonhousehold names, all too often when these men, 
and the Court over which they presided from 1789 to 1800, do receive 
mention, it is only to be dismissed as inferior to what immediately fol-
lowed.  As Robert McCloskey aptly put it in The American Supreme Court, 
“[t]he great shadow of John Marshall . . . falls across our understand-
ing of that first decade; and it has therefore the quality of a play’s 
opening moments with minor characters exchanging trivialities while 
they and the audience await the appearance of the star.”1  In the last 
ten years, scholars have begun to focus more attention on the pre-
Marshall Court,2 but a certain derogatory attitude persists.  One re-
† Associate Editor, The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
1789-1800. A.B. 1976, Harvard University; M.A. 1977, University of Sussex; J.D. 1983, 
University of Pennsylvania.  Much of this Article rests on research done over the last 
thirty years by the staff of the Documentary History Project, which is very much a col-
lective effort.  I would particularly like to thank my colleagues Maeva Marcus and 
Robert P. Frankel, Jr., for their perceptive comments and suggestions. 
1 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 30 (1960); see also Rus-
sell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 
123 [hereinafter Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities] (“There is a widely held notion that 
until Marshall came to the Supreme Court, the Court did nothing.”). 
2 See, e.g., WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:  THE 
CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH (Herbert A. Johnson ed., 
1995) (presenting a general overview of the Supreme Court in the 1790s); STEWART 
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cent popular history of the Supreme Court, for example, describes the 
early Justices as “a thoroughly undistinguished lot.”3
While I have no wish to dislodge Marshall from his position in the 
pantheon of judicial heroes, I would suggest that we will obtain a 
clearer picture of the Supreme Court in its first decade if we bring it 
out, as best we can, from under Marshall’s “great shadow.”  It must be 
remembered that the era during which Marshall was Chief Justice dif-
fered in significant ways from the decade of the 1790s.  In this earlier 
period, despite the new American rhetoric about separation of pow-
ers, a British and colonial tradition of blurring the distinction between 
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches continued to form 
people’s assumptions about how the federal government would func-
tion.  And that government was still so new and fragile that there was 
serious doubt, even among some of those at its helm, as to whether it 
would survive.4  The circumstances of the 1790s called not for bold 
strokes, but for judicial caution. 
While much is still unknown, and most likely unknowable, about 
the internal workings of the Court in this period, much more docu-
mentary evidence is available now than in prior years, thanks in large 
part to the efforts of the project on which I work as an associate edi-
tor.  Drawing on that evidence and other sources, I will attempt to 
JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS:  THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES (1997) (challeng-
ing the assumption that the early role of Justices was limited to adjudicating cases); 
SERIATIM:  THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 
1998) [hereinafter SERIATIM] (collecting biographical sketches of early Justices).  
Much of this recent scholarship was made possible by the documents collected, anno-
tated, and published in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 (vol. 1, Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985-1986; 
vols. 2-7, Maeva Marcus ed., 1989-2003) [hereinafter DHSC].  See also JULIUS GOEBEL, 
JR., ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise His-
tory of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 1, Paul A. Freund ed., 1971) (giv-
ing a comprehensive survey of early Supreme Court history). 
3 PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 86 (1999); see also 
GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER:  JOHN MAR-
SHALL, 1801-15, pt. 1, at 7 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, vol. 2, Paul A. Freund ed., 1981) (arguing that the pre-
Marshall Court was “relatively feeble” and “too unimportant to interest the talents of 
two men who declined President Adams’s offer of the position of Chief Justice”).  But 
see CASTO, supra note 2, at 56 (discussing how President Washington’s “initial selec-
tions . . . included a number of capable individuals”); SERIATIM, supra note 2, at 5 (not-
ing that the first Court included “a number of impressive appointees”). 
4 John Jay himself underscored the experimental nature of the whole endeavor in 
his first grand jury charge, delivered in April 1790, in which he exhorted his listeners 
to “patiently abide the Tryal” of the nation’s attempt at self-government.  John Jay’s 
Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York (Apr. 12, 
1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 25, 27. 
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shed some light on the nature of the Chief Justice’s role in the 1790s.  
I will first discuss the British and colonial origins of the office and the 
factors that were weighed in the selection of Chief Justices in order to 
gain insight into how the position was viewed by contemporaries.  I 
will then turn to the extrajudicial duties and responsibilities shoul-
dered by Chief Justices in the 1790s, and, lastly, attempt to assess the 
role and influence of the Chief Justice within the Court. 
I.  THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE OFFICE 
A.  Where Did the Idea of a Chief Justice Come From? 
Let us begin at the very beginning:  why have a Chief Justice at all?  
The Constitution itself appears to be of two minds on the subject.  
While Article III makes no mention of a Chief Justice,5 in Article I the 
Framers seem to assume that such a position will indeed be created:  
the clause dealing with impeachments provides that “[w]hen the 
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall pre-
side.”6  It was left to the first Federal Congress to resolve the issue, 
which it did without much debate.  The original Senate bill that be-
came the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for a “Chief Justice and five 
associate Justices,” and that language emerged from the Senate debate 
unchanged.7  In the House, Congressman Aedanus Burke moved to 
strike out the phrase, “Chief Justice,” on the ground that it was “a con-
comitant of royalty.”8  But after being informed that the offending 
phrase appeared in the Constitution itself, Burke withdrew his mo-
tion.9
Perhaps the Constitution failed to specifically mandate the posi-
tion of Chief Justice because the Framers simply assumed that one 
would be appointed.  Nearly all contemporary models for a high court 
included a chief judge or justice.  Most prominent among these mod-
els was the Court of King’s Bench, the highest English common-law 
5 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall 
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish.”). 
6 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
7 An Act To Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, § 1, in 4 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 38, 38-39. 
8 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 783 ( Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
9 Id.; An Act To Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, supra note 7, 
§ 1, Original Senate Bill, at 39 n.2. 
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court.10  In the colonies—and then the states, under the Articles of 
Confederation—the majority of high courts also had a chief magis-
trate.11
B.  The Nature of the Office 
Few of the statutes specifying the appointment of a chief judge or 
justice—including the Judiciary Act of 1789—provide any insight into 
the duties or significance of the position, as distinct from those of an 
associate, assistant, or “puisne” judge or justice.  But in eighteenth-
century Britain, there was a long-standing tradition of having the chief 
justice—and, to an even greater extent, the chief’s counterpart in eq-
uity, the chancellor—serve in the cabinet and provide extrajudicial 
advice to the king and the House of Lords.12  Similarly, in America 
during the colonial period, judges of the high courts frequently ad-
vised the legislative and executive branches and held multiple of-
fices.13  Under the unwritten British constitution, the concept of “bal-
anced government” included no independent role for the judiciary.  
Rather than dividing governmental power by function, the British 
model “balanced” classes or orders:  the monarchy, as represented by 
the Crown; the aristocracy, by the House of Lords; and the “people,” 
by the House of Commons.  While theorists did assign different gov-
ernmental functions to different political actors, the judicial function 
was usually seen as a component of the executive power that belonged 
10 See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 16 (1940) (discussing how, in 
terms of providing a model for American judicial organization, the Court of King’s 
Bench was “the most important tribunal” of general jurisdiction).  Indeed, according 
to one account, it was William the Conqueror who had introduced the office of chief 
justice to England in the eleventh century, importing it from his native Normandy, 
“where it had long existed.”  1 LORD CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF 
ENGLAND 1 ( Jersey City, Fred D. Linn & Co. 1881). 
11 See POUND, supra note 10, at 64-72, 92-103 (summarizing the structure of various 
colonial and pre-1789 state courts).  In a number of the colonies, the highest court of 
review was the legislature or the governor and/or council (the upper house of the leg-
islature).  In the three colonies where the highest court was composed of judges—
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania—there was a chief justice.  Id. at 64-67. 
12 See JAY, supra note 2, at 10-22 (discussing the role of eighteenth-century British 
judges in advising the House of Lords and the executive).  The king might consult the 
lord chancellor, the chief justice, other individual judges, or groups of judges on mat-
ters ranging from postponing the opening of parliamentary session to the legality of 
certain royal actions.  In 1614, for example, King James I ordered his attorney general, 
Sir Francis Bacon, to consult each of the judges of the King’s Bench about their feel-
ings concerning a pending treason case.  Although Chief Justice Coke initially resisted 
the request, all of the justices ultimately complied.  Id. at 14-16. 
13 Id. at 52. 
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to the monarch.  And yet, given that the House of Lords was also the 
nation’s highest court, at least a part of the judicial function belonged 
to the legislature.14
In this country, the concept of separation of powers—with gov-
ernmental power divided between the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial branches—had taken root in the formulation of state constitu-
tions beginning in 1776, and it continued to exert a profound effect 
on the Framers of the Federal Constitution.  The meaning of the 
phrase, however, was still ambiguous and developing;15 certainly it did 
not mean then what it does today.  As Stewart Jay has detailed, the 
Framers were primarily concerned with encroachments by one branch 
on the proper preserve of another.  With regard to the judiciary, this 
meant erecting safeguards against legislative domination of the 
courts—hence the provisions in Article III guaranteeing life tenure 
and prohibiting diminution in salary.16  But there is no evidence that 
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention saw any difficulty in 
having judges voluntarily furnish advisory opinions or perform extra-
judicial service.17  Presumably, given long-standing British tradition, 
14 See id. at 24-31 (discussing the concept of judicial independence within the con-
text of the British theory of balanced government). 
15 See id. at 53 (“Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the use of the term as a 
slogan in revolutionary writings and in early state constitutions, the doctrine itself was 
burdened by the ambiguities of a still emerging ideology.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 150-61 (1998) (discussing the no-
tion of separation of powers during the Revolutionary era). 
16 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, re-
ceive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office.”).  These were the two safeguards on judicial independence 
advocated by Montesquieu and Sir William Blackstone, both of whom had a major in-
fluence on the theory behind the American Constitution.  Russell Wheeler, Extrajudi-
cial Activities of United States Supreme Court Justices:  The Constitutional Period, 
1790-1809, at 42-46 (Dec. 1970) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chi-
cago) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wheeler Dissertation]. 
17 Neither Montesquieu nor Blackstone saw any need for a ban on plural office-
holding, as long as it “fell short of a wholesale union of [governmental] branches.”  
Wheeler Dissertation, supra note 16, at 46.  State constitutions drafted after the Revolu-
tion also followed a pattern of securing judicial independence through life tenure and 
adequate salaries, but allowing extrajudicial activity.  Id. at 46-52.  Although the dele-
gates to the Constitutional Convention rejected a formal advisory role for the Chief 
Justice, Stewart Jay concludes that this only meant they disapproved of requiring him to 
respond to the President’s requests for advice; the President might, however, ask, and 
the Chief Justice might choose to respond.  JAY, supra note 2, at 73.  Also, although the 
Constitution bars federal judges—or anyone else holding noncongressional federal 
office—from simultaneously serving in Congress, there is no prohibition against any 
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such advice and service would be expected primarily from the nation’s 
highest judicial officer, the Chief Justice. 
In any event, it is clear from contemporary commentary that the 
position of Chief Justice was seen to confer great importance on the 
man who held it.  In August 1788, John Adams’s daughter, Abigail 
Smith, noted the prediction of Colonel Henry Lee, a member of the 
Confederation Congress, that the office of Chief Justice would be “of 
more importance than [that of] the Vice President[],” and expressed 
her hope that her father would choose the former.18  And to John Jay, 
the positions of Chief Justice and secretary of state appeared suffi-
ciently fungible that, according to two separate commentators, he was 
waiting to see which salary would be higher before making his 
choice.19
Competition for the post of Chief Justice was intense.  Despite 
Jay’s emergence as an early front-runner,20 other names were men-
tioned as well, including those of three men—William Cushing, John 
Rutledge, and James Wilson—who were ultimately chosen as Associate 
Justices.21  While Rutledge accepted the post of senior Associate Jus-
tice, he clearly felt slighted, resigning five months later to become 
chief justice of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas.22
other type of multiple officeholding or extrajudicial service.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6; 
JAY, supra note 2, at 74. 
18 Letter from Abigail Smith to John Quincy Adams (Aug. 20, 1788), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 603, 603. 
19 Letter from Samuel A. Otis to John Langdon (Sept. [16-22], 1789), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 661, 661; Letter from Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering (Sept. 14, 
1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 660, 660.  As it turned out, Congress set the Chief 
Justice’s salary at $500 more than the salary of the secretary of state—$4000 as opposed 
to $3500, with the latter amount also constituting the salary of an Associate Justice.  Act 
of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 18, § 1, 1 Stat. 72, 72; Act of Sept. 11, 1789, ch. 13, § 1, 1 Stat. 67, 
67. 
20 In July 1789, two months before the passage of the Judiciary Act and the ap-
pointment of Justices, John Adams remarked that the office of Chief Justice had been 
“reserv[ed] . . . for Mr. Jay.”  Letter from John Adams to Francis Dana ( July 10, 1789), 
in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 630, 630. 
21 See Letter from Abraham Baldwin to Joel Barlow (Sept. 13, 1789), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 659, 659 (supposing Rutledge or Jay would be appointed); Letter from 
Samuel Barrett to William Cushing ( June 20, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 626, 
626 (assuming Cushing would be appointed); Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Ad-
ams (Apr. 22, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 613, 613 (expecting Wilson to be ap-
pointed). 
22 See Letter from John Rutledge to George Washington (Mar. 5, 1791), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 23, 23 (offering Rutledge’s resignation); Letter from John 
Rutledge to George Washington ( June 12, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 94, 94-95 
(indicating Rutledge’s displeasure over the perceived slight); see also infra notes 29-30 
and accompanying text. 
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The most intensive lobbying campaign for Chief Justice was on 
behalf of Wilson, a Pennsylvania lawyer and prominent legal thinker.  
In April 1789, Wilson wrote directly to Washington, declaring that “my 
Aim rises to the important Office of Chief Justice of the United 
States.”23  Washington’s response was noncommittal,24 as it was to most 
office-seekers at this point, but Wilson’s prominent friends continued 
to press for his appointment.  Benjamin Rush—a Philadelphia physi-
cian who had joined Wilson in leading the campaign for ratification of 
the Constitution in Pennsylvania—urged John Adams to use his influ-
ence as president of the Senate to further Wilson’s nomination.25  And 
Robert Morris—the “financier of the Revolution” and a senator from 
Pennsylvania, who was said to have “the ear of the President as much 
or more than any man”—was also working behind the scenes on Wil-
son’s behalf.26  Although Adams, in declining to support Wilson for 
Chief Justice, but promising to support his nomination as one of the 
Associate Justices, remarked that “the difference is not great between 
the first and the other Judges,”27 it is clear that the general perception 
was quite the opposite. 
II.  THE SELECTION OF A CHIEF JUSTICE 
A.  The First Appointment:  John Jay 
One way of assessing the eighteenth-century view of the Chief Jus-
tice’s role is by looking at the men chosen and rejected by President 
Washington and attempting to discern the reasons for his actions.  
23 Letter from James Wilson to George Washington (Apr. 21, 1789), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 612, 613. 
24 See Letter from George Washington to James Wilson (May 9, 1789), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 618, 618-19 (responding merely that Washington would be impartial 
and disinterested). 
25 Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Apr. 22, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 613, 613; Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams ( June 4, 1789), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 622, 622-23.  Rush’s letter of April 22 reflects an assumption 
that the Senate would do more than simply rubber-stamp Washington’s judicial nomi-
nations. 
26 Letter from Paine Wingate to Timothy Pickering (Sept. 14, 1789), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 660, 660; see also Letter from Arthur Lee to [Francis Lightfoot Lee] 
(May 9, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 617, 617 (mentioning that Morris was work-
ing for Wilson’s appointment); Letter from Robert Morris to Francis Hopkinson (Aug. 
15, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 650, 650 (“[W]ill not [Wilson] have some ap-
pointments to make should things go to our Wishes.”). 
27 Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (May 17, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 619, 619. 
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Generally, in selecting nominees for the Supreme Court, Washington 
considered a number of factors:  character and reputation, health, le-
gal (although not necessarily judicial) experience and ability, loyalty 
to the concept of a federal government, service during the Revolution 
and the constitutional ratification process, and—particularly impor-
tant at a time when citizens’ loyalty to their individual states was often 
stronger than their attachment to the national government—
geographic diversity.28  But when it came to selecting a Chief Justice, it 
appears that Washington gave some of these factors more weight than 
others. 
One thing is fairly clear:  Washington was not looking primarily 
for legal scholarship and ability.  While John Jay was a lawyer and had 
briefly served as chief justice of the New York Supreme Court of Judi-
cature in the 1770s, he did so “erratically and without distinction.”29  
John Rutledge later wrote somewhat huffily to Washington, recalling 
the events of 1789: 
Several of my Friends were displeased at my accepting the Office of an 
Associate Judge, (altho’ the senior,) of the Supreme Court . . . conceiv-
ing, (as I thought, very justly,) that my Pretensions to the Office of Chief-
Justice were, at least, equal to Mr. Jay’s, in point of Law-Knowledge, with 
the Additional Weight, of much longer Experience, & much greater 
Practice.
30
But even greater than Rutledge’s claim, in terms of a reputation 
for legal brilliance, was that of James Wilson.  Although fairly obscure 
today, Wilson was a well-known figure in the 1790s.  One of only six 
men who signed both the Declaration of Independence and the Con-
stitution,31 he had been a leading spokesman for the ratification of the 
latter in Pennsylvania.32  Although he had never served as a judge, he 
was regarded as an erudite legal scholar and the principal theorist of 
the newly emerging American judicial system.33  Many, including Wil-
28 See CASTO, supra note 2, at 56, 66-68 (discussing Washington’s criteria). 
29 Sandra Frances VanBurkleo, “Honour, Justice, and Interest”:  John Jay’s Republican 
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, in SERIATIM, supra note 2, at 26, 31. 
30 Letter from John Rutledge to George Washington ( June 12, 1795), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 94, 94. 
31 Mark D. Hall, James Wilson:  Democratic Theorist and Supreme Court Justice, in SERIA-
TIM, supra note 2, at 126, 126. 
32 Id. at 135-36; CHARLES PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON:  FOUNDING FATHER, 1742-
1798, at 268-80, 297-304 (1956). 
33 SMITH, supra note 32, at 128, 308-10; GEOFFREY SEED, JAMES WILSON 150 (1978).  
In 1790 and 1791, Wilson delivered a series of law lectures at the College of Philadel-
phia that were attended by a distinguished audience and are considered to be the be-
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son himself, assumed that he would be the nation’s first Chief Jus-
tice.34
Why, then, was Wilson nominated instead as an Associate Justice?  
One problem was that he had made a number of quite vocal enemies 
on both ends of the political spectrum.35  Probably more important 
than Wilson’s unpopularity, however, was the question of his charac-
ter.36  Wilson’s extensive speculation in unsettled land on the western 
frontier, and his accumulating debt, had drawn some negative com-
ment.  In a letter to Vice President Adams pleading Wilson’s cause, 
Benjamin Rush admitted, “Much will be said of the deranged state of 
his Affairs.”  He then added, “But where will you find an American 
landholder free from embarrassments?”37  Adams, unconvinced, re-
plied that “Services, Hazards, Abilities and Popularity, all properly 
weighed, the [balance], is in favour of Mr. Jay.”38
It is fairly clear, then, that Washington was not looking for a nomi-
nee for Chief Justice who, despite possessing a brilliant legal mind, in-
ginnings of the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Snippets of History:  Part I 
(1790-1849), http://www.law.upenn.edu/sesquicentennial/scrolling/part1.html (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2006).  Although the lectures were delivered after Wilson’s appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court, the invitation to deliver them had been extended in Au-
gust 1789, before Wilson’s nomination.  20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 329 
(Dumas Malone ed., 1936). 
34 See, e.g., FED. GAZETTE, Mar. 9, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 609, 
609; Letter from Frederick Muhlenberg to Benjamin Rush (Mar. 21, 1789), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 610, 610; Letter from Anthony Wayne to James Wilson (May 20, 1789), 
in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 619, 619; see also Maeva Marcus, Federal Judicial Selection:  The 
First Decade, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 797, 802 (2005) (“In the eyes of many, Wilson’s excep-
tional intellectual promise, so evident throughout his career, should have made him a 
natural leader for the fledgling Supreme Court.”). 
35 See Hall, supra note 31, at 128 (“Wilson’s principled stands in both state and na-
tional politics led him to offend just about every American.”); Letter from Benjamin 
Rush to Tench Coxe (Feb. 26, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 606, 606.  Opposition 
to Wilson’s nomination surfaced in the press.  See, e.g., N.Y. J., Apr. 16, 1789, reprinted in 
1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 611, 611-12; Letter from an Anonymous Correspondent, 
STATE GAZETTE N.C., June 5, 1789, reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 623, 623. 
36 See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 37 (1993) (dis-
cussing the eighteenth-century notion of “character”) 
37 Letter from Benjamin Rush to John Adams (Apr. 22, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 613, 613; see also Letter from Benjamin Rush to Tench Coxe ( Jan. 31, 1789), 
in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 605, 605-06 (urging Coxe, then assistant secretary of the 
treasury, to “circulate” in New York the fact that Wilson had “60,000 acres of good 
land . . . paid for in [Pennsylvania],” along with the argument that “if none but men 
whose cash exceeds the present value of their estates, are to fill the appointments of the 
new [government], one half the Union cannot be represented”). 
38 Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (May 17, 1789), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 619, 619. 
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spired animosity in some quarters and exhibited dubious character 
traits.  But what was he looking for?  What can we learn about his cri-
teria from his selection of John Jay?  To begin with, Jay suffered from 
neither of the two defects that burdened Wilson.  Although Jay was an 
aristocrat who viewed “the people” with fairly unmitigated scorn,39 he 
seems to have been generally popular.  And no whiff of scandal ever 
sullied his reputation.40
On a more positive note, Jay had—like Wilson and Rutledge—
distinguished himself in service to his country, both as president of 
the Continental Congress and as one of the authors of The Federalist 
Papers.41  Unlike these other two candidates, however, much of Jay’s 
experience had been in the realm of foreign affairs:  he had served as 
minister to Spain from 1779 to 1783, helped to negotiate the Treaty of 
Paris that ended the Revolutionary War, and held the post of secretary 
of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation.42  It was as-
sumed by many, in fact, that Jay would hold the analogous post of sec-
retary of state under the new federal government—and indeed, as 
noted earlier, he apparently seriously considered it.43
While experience in foreign affairs is no longer considered impor-
tant in a candidate for Chief Justice, in the circumstances of the 1790s 
it conferred certain advantages.  The United States was still a fledgling 
nation, struggling to gain recognition from the established European 
powers—recognition that would be furthered by the appointment of a 
Chief Justice who was personally known to some of the leading Euro-
pean players.  In addition, some of the most important questions ex-
pected to come before the Court—notably, the question of whether 
the 1783 peace treaty required Americans to repay debts to British 
creditors that had been contracted before the Revolution—implicated 
foreign interests, and might be better resolved by a Chief Justice with 
a diplomatic background.  More generally, given the expectation that 
39 See VanBurkleo, supra note 29, at 29, 33 (characterizing Jay’s family’s position in 
New York society as “lofty” and remarking that he “frequently imputed bestial quali-
ties” to “common folk”). 
40 See 1 POLITICAL CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF AARON BURR 105 n.1 
(Mary-Jo Kline ed., 1983) (alluding to Jay’s “legendary reputation for integrity and 
probity”). 
41 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 6.  Although the authors of The Federalist Papers—James 
Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Jay—wrote their essays anonymously, their identity 
would certainly have been known to Washington and other members of the Federalist 
inner circle. 
42 Id. 
43 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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Jay would function as at least an informal adviser to the President, 
Washington undoubtedly wanted to install someone as Chief Justice 
whom he knew well and whose judgment he trusted—two criteria met 
by Jay.44
B.  Filling a Vacancy:  “Dull Seniority” or Abilities? 
In choosing the first Chief Justice, as well as the first five Associate 
Justices, George Washington had a luxury that would generally be de-
nied him in making subsequent appointments:  time.  He also did not 
yet have to contend with the expectation that a vacancy in the chief 
justiceship would be filled by the most senior Associate Justice. 
1.  Replacing Jay:  The Rutledge Debacle 
When Jay resigned as Chief Justice in June 1795—having been 
elected governor of New York—many observers anticipated that Wil-
liam Cushing, the senior Associate Justice, would be Washington’s 
choice to replace him.45  William Bradford, Jr., Attorney General of 
the United States, believed that “the principle of Rotation”—by which 
he meant seniority—would best preserve the independence of the ju-
diciary from the executive branch.46  On the other hand, Tench Coxe, 
the commissioner of the revenue, believed that “[t]he man of the first 
abilities, that can be found should be induced into the Station [of 
Chief Justice]. . . . [D]ull seniority and length of service should be 
considered as nothing.”47
Even Bradford realized that in certain circumstances—those in 
which “the succession of the eldest puisne judge would be wholly im-
44 See JAY, supra note 2, at 97 (“Undoubtedly, the ease with which [Washington and 
Jay] related was a product of their long and cordial association.”). 
45 See, e.g., FED. ORRERY, June 27, 1795, reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 759, 
759-60; Letter from Edmund T. Ellery to David L. Barnes ( July 23, 1795), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 770, 770; Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell ( July 24, 1795), 
in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 771, 771.  A similar prediction had been made in 1792, 
when it was thought—mistakenly, as it turned out—that Jay had been elected gover-
nor.  See Letter from Benjamin Bourne to [William Channing] (Feb. 21, 1792), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 733, 733 (“Mr. [Cushing] however bids fairest to take [Jay’s] 
place.”). 
46 Letter from William Bradford, Jr., to Samuel Bayard ( June 4, 1795), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 755, 755. 
47 Letter from Tench Coxe to Richard Henry Lee ([Apr. 11, 1792?]), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 735, 735.  Coxe was writing in the spring of 1792, when it was thought 
that Jay would be elected governor of New York that year. 
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proper”—the seniority principle would be unworkable.48  And indeed, 
Bradford believed that those very circumstances obtained in June 
1795:  the choice of Jay’s successor would be “an embarrassing busi-
ness,” given that “[t]he public voice seems already to have excluded 
Mr. C[ushing].”49  At the time, Cushing was being treated for cancer 
of the lip and as a result had missed several days of the Court’s Febru-
ary session.50  More generally, some thought the sixty-three-year-old 
Cushing had seen better days:  “between ourselves,” wrote one ob-
server of the Court’s February session, “Cushing is superannuated & 
contemptible.”51  And even if, considering his age and health, Cushing 
could be expected to decline the nomination, next in line behind him 
was the even more problematic James Wilson, whose financial troubles 
had only worsened.52
Possibly because of the particular individuals who would be ap-
pointed, then, Washington did not initially follow the principle of sen-
iority in replacing Jay, although he soon had reason to think better of 
the choice he made instead.  On the same day that he received Jay’s 
resignation, June 30, 1795, Washington also received a letter from 
John Rutledge.53  In an indication of the greater esteem accorded to 
the role of Chief Justice, Rutledge explained that, although he had re-
signed as Associate Justice after only five months to become chief jus-
tice of the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, “when the Office 
of Chief-Justice, of the United States, becomes vacant, I feel that the 
Duty which I owe to my Children should impel me, to accept it, if of-
48 Letter from William Bradford, Jr., to Samuel Bayard ( June 4, 1795), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 755, 755. 
49 Id. 
50 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 9, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 
2, at 752, 752; Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Feb. 7, 1795), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 752, 752; see also Supreme Court Fine Minutes, Feb. 17-20, 1795, 
in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 169, 238-39 (reflecting Cushing’s absence). 
51 Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Feb. 24, 1795), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 753, 753; see also Letter from William Plumer to Jeremiah Smith (Feb. 19, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 838, 838 (writing that Cushing “once possessed 
abilities, firmness & other qualities requisite for [Chief Justice]; but time, the enemy of 
man, has much impaired his mental faculties”). 
52 William Plumer, a New Hampshire Federalist, may have had Wilson in mind 
when he bemoaned Cushing’s apparent elevation to Chief Justice:  “I fear that the 
promotion . . . will form a precedent for making Chief Justices from the eldest Judge, 
tho’ other candidates may be much better qualified.”  Letter from William Plumer to 
Jeremiah Smith (Feb. 19, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at, 838, 838. 
53 Letter from George Washington to John Rutledge ( July 1, 1795), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 96, 96. 
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fer’d:  tho’ more arduous & troublesome than my present Station, be-
cause, more respectable & honorable.”54
Washington, knowing Rutledge well and anxious to install a new 
Chief Justice before the Court met again in August, immediately gave 
him a recess appointment; a permanent appointment would be sub-
ject to confirmation by the Senate when it came back into session in 
December.55  But on July 16, 1795—probably before he had received 
word of his appointment—Rutledge delivered a fiery speech opposing 
the controversial treaty recently negotiated with England by former 
Chief Justice Jay.  Word of Rutledge’s speech reached the nation’s 
capital, Philadelphia, in late July, along with rumors that in recent 
years Rutledge had exhibited signs of insanity, financial difficulties, 
and alcoholism.56  Despite the ensuing indignant criticism of the ap-
pointment, Rutledge received his temporary commission and presided 
over the latter half of the Supreme Court’s August Term.57  But in De-
cember, the Senate rejected Rutledge’s nomination by a vote of four-
teen to ten.58  While Rutledge almost certainly would also have been 
54 Letter from John Rutledge to George Washington ( June 12, 1795), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 94, 94. 
55 At least one observer, Thomas Jefferson, saw the appointment of Rutledge as 
“intended merely to establish a precedent against the descent of that office by senior-
ity.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Mar. 2, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 841, 841. 
56 See Letter from William Bradford, Jr., to Alexander Hamilton (Aug. 4, 1795), in 
1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 775, 775 (“The crazy speech of Mr. Rutledge joined to certain 
information that he is daily sinking into debility of mind & body will probably prevent 
him to receiving the appointment [of Chief Justice].”); Letter from Edmund Randolph 
to George Washington ( July 25, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 772, 772 (reporting 
rumors that Rutledge was “deranged”); Letter from Edmund Randolph to George 
Washington (Aug. 5, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 776, 776 (noting that “reports 
of [Rutledge’s] attachment to his bottle, his puerility, and extravagances, together with 
a variety of indecorums and imprudencies multiply daily”); see also John Rutledge, Vindi-
cated:  “A South Carolinean” to Benjamin Russell, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL, Aug. 28, 1795, 
reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 789, 791, 792 n.4 (describing Rutledge’s financial 
problems). 
57 Rutledge received official notice of his commission too late for him to arrive for 
the first nine days of the Court’s eighteen-day Term.  See Supreme Court Fine Minutes, 
Aug. 4-12, 1795, in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 169, 244-47 & n.191 (reflecting Rutledge’s 
absence). 
58 Rejection by Senate (Dec. 15, 1795), reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 98, 98-
99.  Rutledge resigned as Chief Justice in a letter dated December 28, 1795, apparently 
before he knew of the Senate’s rejection.  Letter from John Rutledge to George Wash-
ington (Dec. 28, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 100, 100.  Shortly before he wrote 
the letter, Rutledge had attempted to commit suicide—an indication that rumors of 
his mental instability had some basis.  Letter from William Read to Jacob Read (Dec. 
29, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 820, 820-21. 
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rejected had he been nominated as Associate Justice, outrage may 
have been stronger because the nomination was for the higher post.  
“C[hief] Justices must not go to illegal Meetings and become popular 
orators in favour of Sedition,” John Adams wrote to his wife, Abigail, 
“nor inflame the popular discontents which are ill founded, nor [pro-
pagate] Disunion, Division, Contention and delusion among the Peo-
ple.”59
2.  Replacing Rutledge:  A Flirtation With Seniority 
Washington was now faced with another vacancy for Chief Justice, 
and, as before, a certain amount of time pressure, since the Court’s 
next sitting was less than two months away.  Surely not wanting to risk 
another embarrassment, such as might occur if Wilson were to be 
nominated, Washington again initially attempted to avoid a resort to 
seniority.  Perhaps for political reasons, he put feelers out to Patrick 
Henry, the great firebrand of the Revolution, to see if he might be in-
terested in the job.60
Henry, however, was dilatory in responding.61  By early January, 
with still no word, Washington, who had been waiting for Henry’s an-
swer before also filling vacancies for Associate Justice and secretary of 
war, was clearly exasperated.62  The Supreme Court would be meeting 
59 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Dec. 17, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 813, 813.  While some have maintained that Rutledge’s rejection was due 
solely to political considerations rather than to rumors of his mental instability, it is 
difficult to separate the two strands of opposition.  The very fact that he had delivered 
such a speech, after putting his name forward for the office of Chief Justice, raised 
doubts about his state of mind.  See, e.g., Letter from Edmund Randolph to George 
Washington ( July 29, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 773, 773 (“The conduct of the 
intended Chief Justice is so extraordinary, that Mr. Wolcott and Col. Pickering con-
ceive it to be a proof of the imputation of insanity.”). 
60 One historian of the early Court has suggested that the appointment of 
Henry—who, though at that point loyal to the federal government, had been a fierce 
opponent of the Constitution during the ratification debates—might have mollified 
Anti-Federalists who were disgruntled about Rutledge’s rejection.  James R. Perry, Su-
preme Court Appointments, 1789-1801:  Criteria, Presidential Style, and the Press of Events, 6 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 371, 394 (1986). 
61 Letter from Henry Lee to George Washington (Dec. 9, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 811, 811; Letter from Henry Lee to Patrick Henry (Dec. 17, 1795), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 814, 814; Letter from Henry Lee to George Washington (Dec. 
26, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 819, 819. 
62 Letter from George Washington to Henry Lee ( Jan. 11, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 829, 829. 
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in a few weeks, with a number of important cases on its docket, and its 
membership was down to four, a bare quorum.63
Perhaps out of desperation, Washington at last resorted to senior-
ity:  the aged and unwell William Cushing may not have been the per-
fect candidate for the job, but at least Washington knew that he would 
be in town for the Supreme Court’s impending session.  And, given 
the lingering expectations that seniority would play a role in the selec-
tion of the next Chief Justice, his nomination would not come as a 
complete surprise—except, perhaps, to Cushing himself.  According 
to what may be an apocryphal story, the first indication Cushing had 
of his nomination and confirmation as Chief Justice—which took 
place on January 26 and 27, 1796, respectively64—was at a dinner party 
hosted by Washington shortly before the start of the Supreme Court’s 
February session.  “The Chief Justice of the United States will please 
take the seat on my right,” Washington supposedly said to a startled 
Cushing.65
Regardless of the exact circumstances, it is clear that Cushing had 
serious doubts about accepting the nomination from the moment he 
first heard about it.66  On February 2—the first scheduled day of the 
Supreme Court’s Term, and possibly the very day Cushing arrived in 
the capital67—he drafted a letter to Washington explaining that he 
had chosen to remain an Associate Justice, rather than become Chief, 
because of his “infirm & declining state of health.”68  This decision was 
63 Id.  The Court would be hearing arguments in, among other cases, Ware v. Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), which raised the sensitive issue of British debts.  See 7 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 203-07 (discussing the case and its importance). 
64 Nomination by George Washington ( Jan. 26, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 
101, 101; Confirmation by Senate ( Jan. 27, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 101, 101. 
65 GEORGE VAN SANTVOORD, SKETCHES OF THE LIVES AND JUDICIAL SERVICES OF 
THE CHIEF-JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 245 n.* (1854). 
66 See Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 2, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 834, 834 (“Judge Cushing declines the Place of Chief-Justice on Account of 
his Age and declining Health.”); Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 6, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 835, 835 (“Judge Cushing has been wavering, some-
times he would and sometimes he would not be C[hief] J[ustice].”). 
67 On February 2, only Justices William Paterson and James Wilson were present, 
and the Court adjourned for lack of a quorum.  Cushing made his first appearance the 
following day.  Supreme Court Fine Minutes, Feb. 2-3, 1796, in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, 
at 169, 255.  If one discounts the possibly apocryphal story about Cushing’s dinner with 
Washington shortly before the opening of the Court’s Term, see supra text accompany-
ing note 65, it would seem likely that Cushing did not arrive in town until February 2. 
68 Letter from William Cushing to George Washington (Feb. 2, 1796), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 103, 103.  Ironically, despite concerns about his age and health, Cush-
ing outlived all of the other Washington appointees, remaining on the bench until his 
death in 1810 at the age of 78.  1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 26. 
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greeted with general relief.  “Mr. Cushing has been appointed Chief 
Justice,” one former congressman wrote, “but discovered great wisdom 
in refusing it.”69
One recent commentator, relying largely on the fact that the 
rough version of the Supreme Court minutes originally identified 
Cushing as “Chief Justice” on February 3 and 4, has argued that Cush-
ing should be considered the nation’s third Chief Justice.70  But the 
notation “Chief Justice” could easily have been an error on the clerk’s 
part:  as the most senior Associate Justice, Cushing was presiding over 
the Court and thus may have looked like a Chief Justice.  News of his 
appointment was probably widely known,71 while news of his decision 
to decline the appointment may not yet have been disseminated.72  
Another possibility is that, despite having drafted a letter declining the 
appointment, Cushing was still undecided.  In any case, by February 5, 
the Court’s rough minutes were back to identifying Cushing as an As-
sociate Justice,73 and Washington was yet again faced with a vacancy in 
the nation’s highest judicial office. 
Not only that, but, having once resorted to the principle of senior-
ity, he was now faced with the awkward presence of an expectant 
69 Letter from Elias Boudinot to Samuel Bayard (Feb. 18, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 838, 838; see also Letter from Henry Sherburne to Benjamin Bourne (Feb. 23, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 840, 840 (“It is generally thought that Neighbour 
Cushing gave a Clear proof of his Understanding when he refused the Chief Justice-
ship.”).  But see Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Feb. 21, 1796), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 839, 839 (“I am very sorry that Judge Cushing has refused his appoint-
ment.”); Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Feb. 27, 1796), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 840, 840 (“I am sorry that Mr. Cushing refused the office of Chief Jus-
tice . . . .”).  These expressions of regret at Cushing’s refusal seem to stem from fears 
that his replacement might be worse. 
70 See generally Ross E. Davies, William Cushing:  Chief Justice of the United States, 37 U. 
TOL. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2006) (manuscript at 5-10), http://www.law. 
utoledo.edu/lawreview/daviesrev.pdf.  Davies argues that Cushing should be pre-
sumed to have taken his oath of office as Chief Justice, despite the lack of any evidence 
that he did so. 
71 An announcement of Cushing’s appointment as Chief Justice appeared in a 
Philadelphia newspaper, Claypoole’s American Daily Advertiser, on January 28, 1796.  Let-
ter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer ( Jan. 29, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, 
at 833, 833 n.1. 
72 In an indication of how slowly news traveled in the 1790s, even within the na-
tion’s capital, on February 7, 1796—two days after the Supreme Court minutes began 
unequivocally to record Cushing as “Associate Justice”—James Madison, then in Phila-
delphia, wrote to Thomas Jefferson that “it is said [Cushing] will decline” the ap-
pointment as Chief Justice.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 7, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 835, 835. 
73 Supreme Court Original Minutes, Feb. 5, 1796, in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 333, 
408. 
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James Wilson.  Wilson’s business difficulties would soon be reaching a 
state of crisis:  later in 1796, he would be caught in a general financial 
collapse, and thereafter would be on a calamitous downward trajec-
tory that included imprisonment for debt, neglect of his judicial du-
ties, and an ignominious death in North Carolina while hiding out 
from his creditors.74  Although, of course, his contemporaries could 
not have predicted all of this in February 1796, there was clearly some 
alarm about the prospect of a Wilson chief justiceship. 
3.  After Cushing: 
A Return to the Criteria of Ability—and Reliability 
After Cushing declined to serve, some speculated that Washington 
might pass over Wilson to select one of the more junior Justices; Wil-
liam Paterson of New Jersey, well regarded as a jurist but the second 
most junior Justice, was mentioned.  “Some say Wilson will have the 
offer & some say the President will leap over his head to [Paterson] 
which G[od] of his infinite mercy grant,” wrote the Federalist Con-
gressman Jeremiah Smith.75  But others thought such a move would 
appear blatantly improper.  Associate Justice James Iredell dismissed 
his friends’ predictions that he himself would be appointed in Cush-
ing’s place, explaining that, among other reasons, “there could have 
been no propriety in passing by Judge Wilson to come at me.”76
74 3 DHSC, supra note 2, at 151-52, 238-39. 
75 Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Feb. 17, 1796), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 837, 838; see also Letter from Uriah Tracy to Oliver Wolcott, Sr. (Feb. 10, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 836, 836 (speculating that Paterson was being 
“thought of” as a nominee for Chief Justice).  Paterson had drawn favorable commen-
tary from the time of his appointment in 1793.  See Letter from William Richardson 
Davie to James Iredell ( June 12, 1793), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 406, 406 (describ-
ing Paterson as having a “fine understanding” and “affable manner”); DUNLAP’S AM. 
DAILY ADVERTISER, June 15, 1793, reprinted in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 406, 406-07 
(writing approvingly of Paterson’s conduct in the federal circuit court for North Caro-
lina); Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Feb. 24, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 753, 753 (“The rest of the Court [besides Paterson] were like molehills be-
side the Alps.  I speak the general sentiment.”). 
76 Letter from James Iredell to Helen Tredwell (Mar. 25, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 846, 846; see also Letter from Samuel Johnston to James Iredell (Feb. 27, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 840, 840 (“I am sorry that Mr. Cushing refused the 
office of Chief Justice, as I don[’]t know whether a less exceptionable character can be 
obtained without passing over Mr. W[ilson] which would perhaps be a measure which 
could not be easily reconciled to strict propriety . . . .”). 
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Washington faced a difficult dilemma,77 exacerbated by the nega-
tive reaction that had greeted his recent appointment of Samuel 
Chase as an Associate Justice.78  Nevertheless, he managed to find 
someone who not only happened to be in town,79 but was also highly 
regarded:  Oliver Ellsworth, a Connecticut senator who had played an 
important role in the Constitutional Convention and had been a 
judge on Connecticut’s highest judicial court.  Perhaps more impor-
tant, Ellsworth was the principal architect of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
the statute governing the federal courts, and his interpretation of it as 
a Justice would therefore carry considerable weight.80  Moreover, Ells-
worth was a reliable Federalist whom Washington knew personally and 
no doubt felt he could turn to for advice.81  On March 3, 1796, Wash-
ington sent Ellsworth’s name to the Senate, where his nomination was 
confirmed the following day with only one dissenting vote.82
Ellsworth’s appointment was greeted enthusiastically.  On March 
5, Jeremiah Smith—the Federalist congressman who had previously 
been hoping for a Paterson appointment83—wrote to a friend that “no 
appointment in the U.S. has been more wise or judicious than this.”84  
77 See Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Feb. 6, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 835, 835 (surmising that Cushing’s wavering “will give the P[resident] some 
trouble”); Letter from Elias Boudinot to Samuel Bayard (Feb. 18, 1796), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 838, 838 (writing that it was not known whom the President contem-
plated for the office of Chief Justice). 
78 See, e.g., Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Mar. 5, 1796), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 842, 842 (“The Nomination of Mr. Chase had given occasion to un-
charitable Reflections . . . .”).  Washington had nominated Chase as Associate Justice 
on January 26, the same day he nominated Cushing as Chief Justice.  The Senate con-
firmed the nomination the following day.  Confirmation by Senate ( Jan. 27, 1796), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 101, 101. 
79 The Supreme Court’s session was still ongoing, and would continue until March 
14, making it the longest session the Court had yet had.  Supreme Court Fine Minutes, 
in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 169, 272 n.217. 
80 See William R. Casto, Oliver Ellsworth:  “I Have Sought the Felicity and Glory of Your 
Administration,” in SERIATIM, supra note 2, at 292, 297-300 (summarizing Ellsworth’s 
career prior to his appointment as Chief Justice). 
81 See id. at 292 (“As a senator and then as chief justice, he consciously sought to 
support the Federalist administrations of George Washington and John Adams.”).  
Ellsworth had been deputized by some of his fellow senators to suggest to Washington 
that he appoint a special envoy to Britain in 1794—an envoy that turned out to be 
Chief Justice Jay.  Id. at 301.  And, almost immediately after his confirmation as Chief 
Justice, Ellsworth provided the administration with an opinion on the implementation 
of the Jay Treaty.  See infra text accompanying note 128. 
82 Confirmation by Senate (Mar. 4, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 120, 120-21. 
83 See supra text accompanying note 75. 
84 Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Mar. 5, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 843, 843; see also Letter from Jonathan Trumbull to John Trumbull (Mar. 4, 
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Vice President John Adams, in expressing his approval of Ellsworth, 
seemed relieved that the President had not adhered to the principle 
of seniority:  “Mr. Wilson[’]s ardent Speculations had given offence to 
some, and his too frequent affectation of Popularity to others.”85  As 
for Wilson himself, his friend and colleague James Iredell believed—
mistakenly, as it turned out—that he would resign from the Court as a 
result of the snub.86
4.  Adams and the Seniority Principle 
One might think that Washington’s selection of Ellsworth over 
Wilson had put to rest the idea that a vacancy in the position of Chief 
Justice would be filled according to seniority.  But when Ellsworth re-
signed in 1800, for reasons of ill health, John Adams—who had now 
succeeded Washington as President—revealed that he was not quite 
ready to abandon the seniority principle entirely. 
Adams’s first impulse was to turn once more to John Jay, who had 
recently declined renomination to a third term as governor of New 
York.87  Many found the nomination surprising, since Jay had recently 
announced his intention to retire from public life on account of age 
and ill health.88  Some of Adams’s detractors derided the nomination 
as a joke:  Timothy Pickering expressed regret “that the P[resident] 
will so often sport in serious things.”89  Others, including Thomas Jeffer-
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 842, 842 (postulating that Ellsworth will be “a great 
Loss . . . to the Senate . . . but a valuable acquisition to the Court”); Letter from John 
Adams to Abigail Adams (Mar. 5, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 842, 842 (“It will 
give a Stability to the Government . . . to place a Man of his Courage Constancy forti-
tude and Capacity in that situation.”); Letter from Joshua Coit to Elias Perkins (Mar. 5, 
1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 843, 843 (“I think it will give you pleasure to be in-
formed that Mr. Ellsworth is C[hief] Justice of the U.S.”); Letter from Oliver Wolcott, 
Sr., to Jonathan Trumbull (Mar. 14, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 845, 846 (“[I]f 
our country shall be preserved from anarchy and confusion, it must be by men of [Ells-
worth’s] Character.”). 
85 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Mar. 5, 1796), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 842, 842. 
86 See Letter from James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (Mar. 3-4, 1796), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 841, 841-42 (“I think it not unlikely that Wilson will resign.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
87 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 7. 
88 See, e.g., Letter from Timothy Pickering to Rufus King ( Jan. 5, 1801), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 913, 913.  Jay was fifty-five.  In fact, Jay lived on for another 
twenty-eight years, which he spent in retirement on his estate in Bedford, New York.  1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 7. 
89 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Oliver Wolcott, Jr. ( Jan. 3, 1801), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 912, 912; see also Letter from James McHenry to Oliver Wolcott, Jr. 
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son, suspected that Jay’s appointment was part of a Federalist plot to 
prevent the election of either Jefferson or Aaron Burr as President 
and instead put the government in the hands of the Chief Justice.90  
Jay declined the position, citing the failure of Congress to eliminate 
the Justices’ burdensome circuit-riding duties.91  Adams was doubtless 
aware that Congress was about to pass a judiciary bill that would ad-
dress that very problem,92 but he failed to mention the bill in his letter 
offering the chief justiceship to Jay.93
In any event, virtually no one—including, apparently, Adams him-
self—seriously expected Jay to accept the nomination.94  Even before 
(Jan. 22, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 919, 919 (stating that Jay’s nomination “ex-
cited the idea, that Mr. Adams considered” declarations of retirement such as Jay’s 
“were always made without sincerity, and meant to be disregarded”); Letter from 
Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 28, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 
911, 911 (“The nomination is here considered as having been made in one of those 
‘sportive’ humours for which [Adams] is distinguished.”). 
90 See AURORA (Phila.), Feb. 3, 1801, reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 926, 926 
(mentioning a Federalist plot to overturn the election of the President); Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 26, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 908, 
908 (“[T]he Feds appear determined to prevent an election . . . .”); Letter from Rich-
ard D. Spaight to John G. Blount ( Jan. 13, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 915, 915 
(“[I]t is [the Federalists’] wish if they Can to prevent either [Jefferson or Burr] from 
being President, & to provide by law . . . the Chief-Justice shall administer the Govern-
ment . . . .”); see also Thomas Rodney Diary Entry ( Jan. 26, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 922, 922 (“Adams probably made this appointment to affront the Democ-
rats.”).  The presidential election of 1800, in which the two presidential candidates 
were Adams and Jefferson, unexpectedly ended in a tie in the electoral college be-
tween Jefferson and Aaron Burr.  The tie threw the election into the House of Repre-
sentatives.  See generally ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 36, at 746-50 (describing the 
events ultimately leading to a tiebreak in favor of Jefferson). 
91 Letter from John Jay to John Adams ( Jan. 2, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 
146, 146-47.  The Judiciary Act of 1789 had created circuit courts but no circuit judges.  
Instead, circuit courts were to be held by the local district judge and one or two travel-
ing Supreme Court Justices.  See infra text accompanying notes 179-80.  Although Jay’s 
letter declining the nomination has been read as a general condemnation of the early 
Court as a weak institution, a careful reading of it in the context of the 1790s indicates 
that what Jay was condemning was not the Court itself but the failure of Congress to 
reform the circuit-riding system. 
92 See infra note 181. 
93 Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Dec. 19, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 
145, 145-46. 
94 See Letter from John Adams to Thomas B. Adams (Dec. 23, 1800), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 906, 906-07 (“I have appointed Mr. Jay Chief Justice.  He may refuse.”); 
Letter from Abigail Adams to Thomas B. Adams (Dec. 25, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 907, 907 (“[I]f [Jay] refuses as I fear he will, [Mr.] Cushing will be offered 
it . . . .”); Letter from Timothy Pickering to Rufus King ( Jan. 5, 1801), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 913, 913 (“The P[resident] as well as every body else must know that Mr. 
Jay will not accept the office.”); Letter from Robert Troup to Rufus King (Dec. 31, 
1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 912, 912 (“[N]o one believes [Jay] will accept the 
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he received Jay’s letter declining to serve, Adams had declared that he 
would probably “follow the Line of Judges”—in other words, fill the 
position according to seniority—if Jay refused.95  Presumably Adams 
meant he would first make an offer to Cushing, who—now even more 
aged than he had been in 1796—seemed no more likely to accept the 
post than Jay.96
One reason that seniority may have seemed a more attractive 
principle in 1800 than it had in 1796 was that James Wilson—who had 
died in 1798—was no longer next in line behind Cushing.  Instead, 
there was William Paterson, whose reputation was unblemished and 
whose judicial abilities were still admired by many.97  The ultimate ap-
pointment of Paterson as Chief Justice was widely viewed with satisfac-
tion as nearly a foregone conclusion, and the speculation was about 
who would replace him as Associate Justice.98  And yet, to the aston-
appointment.”); Letter from Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Alexander Hamilton (Dec. 25, 
1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 908, 908 (“[T]he President has sported a nomina-
tion of Mr. Jay, who will n[ot] accept the appointment.”); Letter from Oliver Wolcott, 
Jr., to Timothy Pickering (Dec. 28, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 911, 911 (“[W]e 
might suppose it impossible, that Mr. Jay should resume a station more arduous, than 
that which he has declined on account of advanced age.”).  As with Cushing, Jay’s 
nomination had been sent to the Senate and confirmed before he was apprised of it.  
Confirmation by Senate (Dec. 19, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 144, 144. 
95 Letter from John Adams to Thomas B. Adams (Dec. 23, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 906, 906.  Adams was already thinking about whom he would nominate to 
replace the Associate Justice who would ascend to the chief justiceship.  Id. 
96 See Letter from Abigail Adams to Thomas B. Adams (Dec. 25, 1800), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 907, 907 (expressing her belief that if Jay refused the chief justiceship, 
“[Mr.] Cushing will be offered it”).  Years later, John Marshall wrote that Adams never 
had any intention of offering the chief justiceship to Cushing.  See Letter from John 
Marshall to Joseph Story (1827), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 928, 928 (indicating that 
Marshall was Adams’s choice after Jay).  However, Marshall’s recollection appears less 
trustworthy than the contemporaneous writings of Adams himself and of his wife. 
97 See Letter from Edward Rutledge to Henry Middleton Rutledge (Nov. 1, 1796), 
in 3 DHSC, supra note 2, at 139, 139 (writing that Paterson “is a good Lawyer, & pos-
sesses sound Judgment”); Letter from Robert Troup to Rufus King (Sept. 2, 1799), in 3 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 383, 383 (“Paterson is the most popular & respected of all the 
supreme Court Judges.”); see also supra note 75. 
98 See Letter from Abigail Adams to Thomas B. Adams (Dec. 25, 1800), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 907, 907 (“[I]f [Cushing] declines, then [Mr. Paterson] will be ap-
pointed.”); Letter from Samuel A. Otis to John Adams ( Jan. 13, 1801), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 914-15 (suggesting replacements for Paterson as Associate Justice); Letter 
from Timothy Pickering to Rufus King ( Jan. 5, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 913, 
913 (“As Mr. Jay will certainly refuse the Chief-Justiceship, I presume Judge [Paterson] 
will be appointed: and his vacancy, I am disposed to think, will be filled either from 
N[ew] York or Pennsylvania . . . .”); Letter from Samuel Sewall to Theodore Sedgwick 
(Dec. 29, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 911, 911 (“I am pleased at the prospect of 
Mr. [Paterson] succeeding to the place of Chief Justice . . . .”). 
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ishment of some observers, on January 20, 1801, Adams nominated his 
secretary of state, John Marshall, to the vacant office of Chief Justice.99 
What happened? 
Most likely, Adams turned to Marshall under the combined pres-
sure of politics and time.  On January 19—the day that Adams offered 
the chief justiceship to Marshall100—he was notified by Secretary of the 
Navy Benjamin Stoddert that the House was about to pass what be-
came the Judiciary Act of 1801.101  Among other things, this statute 
would reduce the number of Supreme Court Justices from six to five 
from the time of the next vacancy.102  If Adams elevated one of the ex-
isting Associate Justices to Chief Justice, he would create a vacancy 
which he might well not have time to fill before the Act took effect, 
and the Court would remain at five members.  But if he chose some-
one from outside the Court, he would leave a six-member Federalist-
appointed Court intact when his administration came to an end in two 
months, and his successor—his political rival Thomas Jefferson—
would have to wait for two resignations before he could fill a vacancy 
with an appointee of his own.  Given the delicacy of the situation, 
Stoddert advised that “there might be more difficulty in appointing a 
chief Justice without taking him from the present Judges, after the 
passage of this bill even by one Branch of the Legislature, than be-
fore.”103  Since the bill was expected to pass in the House the next day, 
time was of the essence.104
99 Nomination by John Adams ( Jan. 20, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 152, 
152; see also Letter from Jonathan Dayton to William Paterson ( Jan. 20, 1801), in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 918, 918 (expressing “grief, astonishment & almost indigna-
tion” that Marshall had been nominated instead of Paterson); Letter from James 
McHenry to Oliver Wolcott, Jr. ( Jan. 22, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 919, 920 
(“Here [in Baltimore] it was expected, by every body, that [Adams] would have named 
Mr. [Paterson] to the vacant seat on the bench . . . .”). 
100 Marshall recalled that Adams offered him the chief justiceship the day before 
he sent Marshall’s name to the Senate.  Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story 
(1827), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 928, 928.  Since Adams sent the nomination to the 
Senate on January 20, the conversation would have taken place on January 19. 
101 Letter from Benjamin Stoddert to John Adams (Jan. 19, 1801), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 917, 917. 
102 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 284, 291. 
103 Letter from Benjamin Stoddert to John Adams (Jan. 19, 1801), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 917, 917. 
104 Marshall himself had a slightly different recollection of the events surrounding 
his nomination.  See Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (1827), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 928, 928 (recalling that his name came up while he discussed potential 
nominees with Adams).  But at least one historian has cast doubt on his account.  See 
Perry, supra note 60, at 405-07 (suggesting that Marshall incorrectly recalled the 
events). 
 
2006] THE FIRST THREE CHIEF JUSTICES 1395 
 
While Marshall was highly respected and seen as well qualified to 
be an Associate Justice,105 supporters of Paterson were shocked and 
dismayed at what they saw as an inexplicable snub.  Jonathan Dayton, 
a senator from New Jersey—Paterson’s home state—saw Adams’s fail-
ure to nominate Paterson as one more manifestation of his general 
“debility or derangement of intellect.”106  What most disturbed Pater-
son’s supporters, Dayton said, was the fear that Paterson would resign 
from the Court as a result of “the injury done to” him; Dayton was 
greatly relieved to receive a letter from Paterson in which he lightly 
brushed off the possibility that he would have accepted the chief jus-
ticeship, had it been offered to him, and graciously praised Marshall 
as a “man of genius.”107
Thus, in choosing the nation’s first Chief Justices, legal ability, ex-
perience, and seniority were important, but not primary, factors.  
They could be trumped by considerations of character, trustworthi-
ness, and political expediency.  Had James Wilson been less reckless in 
conducting his financial affairs, he might well have been the nation’s 
first Chief Justice—or at least its second or third.  And, in filling the 
vacancy for Chief Justice in 1801, President Adams might well have 
abided by his original intention to follow “the Line of Judges,” instead 
 In 1827, Marshall recalled that some suspected that Adams refused to appoint 
Paterson as Chief Justice because of Paterson’s association with Adams’s political en-
emy, Alexander Hamilton.  But Marshall himself seemed to discount that theory. See 
Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (1827), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 928, 928 
(“I never heard him assign any other objection to Judge Paterson . . . .”).  In 1803, the 
Philadelphia newspaper Aurora alleged that Paterson was not appointed Chief Justice 
because a circuit court opinion he had written in 1795 had earned him the enmity of 
“all New England.”  Id. at 929 n.2 (referring to Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795)).  There is, however, no evidence to support this the-
ory. 
105 Adams had in fact offered Marshall the position of Associate Justice in 1798, 
when the death of James Wilson created a vacancy.  Marshall turned down the offer, 
and the seat went instead to Bushrod Washington.  1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 125-26. 
106 Letter from Jonathan Dayton to William Paterson ( Jan. 20, 1801), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 918, 918; see also Letter from Jonathan Dayton to William Paterson 
( Jan. 28, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 923, 923 (calling Adams a “wild freak of a 
man”). 
107 Letter from William Paterson to Jonathan Dayton ( Jan. 25, 1801), in 1 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 920, 920; see also Letter from Jonathan Dayton to William Paterson 
(Feb. 1, 1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 924, 924 (expressing relief that Paterson 
would remain on the Court).  Paterson said he was surprised by Marshall’s nomination 
only because it was the first time the Court would have two Justices from the same 
state—Marshall and Bushrod Washington, who had replaced James Wilson, were both 
from Virginia.  This is an indication that the jealousies of the individual states were be-
coming less of a factor in presidential appointments. 
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of turning to John Marshall, if the progress of the judiciary bill had 
not made a nomination from within the Court politically unwise. 
III.  THE EXTRAJUDICIAL ROLE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
The Chief Justices of the 1790s engaged in a number of extrajudi-
cial activities that, to the modern eye, appear incompatible with their 
roles as the nation’s chief magistrates.  As always, however, these ac-
tivities must be viewed in the context of their times, when governmen-
tal manpower was in short supply and the principles of separation of 
powers were still evolving.  Moreover, as one commentator has ob-
served, the early Court “faced a President and Congress anxious to 
adopt a basic assumption of the English constitution, the assumption 
that judges were obligated to serve the nation extrajudicially in various 
ex officio capacities in which their judicial skills would be of use.”108  
What is remarkable, therefore, is not that the Justices of the 1790s 
sometimes complied with this expectation, but rather that they some-
times did not. 
A.  Extrajudicial Duties Imposed by Statute 
As noted above, in eighteenth-century England and in colonial 
and early state governments in America, lines between judicial and 
nonjudicial functions were often blurred.  And despite the new em-
phasis on separation of powers, this casual attitude towards extrajudi-
cial service carried over to some extent under the Constitution.109  
While the Constitution prohibited members of Congress from holding 
multiple offices, for example, no such explicit bar applied to judges.110  
Thus John Jay was able to serve simultaneously as Chief Justice and se-
cretary of state for several months in 1789 and 1790, while awaiting 
Thomas Jefferson’s arrival to take up the latter post.111  As Jay himself 
said, in a letter he drafted to George Washington on behalf of the 
Court, there was an accepted distinction between a court and its 
108 Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 123-24. 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 15-17. 
110 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United 
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”); JAY, 
supra note 2, at 74-75. 
111 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 6.  Jefferson had been in Paris as minister to France 
until October 1789.  He arrived home at Monticello in December, but did not arrive in 
New York to take up his post as secretary of state until March 22, 1790.  See 10 DIC-
TIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 17, 23 (Dumas Malone ed., 1936) (giving Thomas 
Jefferson’s biography). 
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judges, “and [we] are far from thinking it illegal or unconstitutional, 
however it may be inexpedient to employ them for other Purposes, 
provided the latter Purposes be consistent and compatible with the 
former.”112
A number of federal statutes enacted in the 1790s imposed admin-
istrative duties on federal judges, marshals, and clerks—only some of 
which could be characterized as judicial.113  Among these were two 
that imposed duties specifically on the Chief Justice.  A 1790 act ap-
pointed the Chief Justice—along with the Vice President and three 
cabinet members—to the board of the Sinking Fund Commission, 
which was charged with using surplus revenues to liquidate the na-
tion’s outstanding debts.114  Two years later, the statute establishing 
the United States Mint included a provision appointing the Chief Jus-
tice to a board charged with ensuring that coins had the proper con-
tent of gold or silver.115  In both instances, there was British precedent 
for service of a high judicial officer on a similar body.  And the pres-
ence of the Chief Justice on the Sinking Fund Commission and the 
board of the Mint, it was thought, would ensure public confidence in 
their operation while allowing both bodies to benefit from the Chief 
Justice’s presumed legal expertise.116
These appointments provoked no negative comment, and both 
Jay and Ellsworth fulfilled their statutory duties without protest.117  But 
when a conflict arose between Jay’s judicial responsibilities and his 
service on the Sinking Fund Commission, he felt the need to set pri-
orities:  on March 21, 1792, Vice President John Adams—also a mem-
ber of the Sinking Fund Commission, which was meeting in Philadel-
phia—wrote to Jay, who was at home in New York, to say that Jay’s 
presence was required to break a deadlock on a point of statutory in-
112 Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Sept. 13, 
1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 89, 90.  The letter was written to protest the imposi-
tion of circuit-riding duties on the Justices.  Jay’s point was that, while some extrajudi-
cial duties might be imposed on the Justices, they could not simultaneously serve as 
judges on inferior courts. 
113 See generally 4 DHSC, supra note 2, app. A at 723-29 (discussing the administra-
tive duties of the judges). 
114 Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 2, 1 Stat. 186, 186; CASTO, supra note 2, at 174. 
115 Act of Apr. 2, 1792, ch. 16, § 18, 1 Stat. 246, 250; CASTO, supra note 2, at 174. 
116 Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 139-41; JAY, supra note 2, at 92-
93. 
117 Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 142; JAY, supra note 2, at 92. 
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terpretation.118  Jay wrote back that he could not attend because of the 
impending opening of the circuit court in New York:  he viewed his 
judicial duty “as being in point of legal Obligation primary, and to at-
tend the Trustees as secondary.”  He added, however, that he could 
conceive “that the Order would be sometimes inverted, if only the 
Importance of the occasion was considered.”  Since the question at is-
sue was “a [mere] law Question,” Jay sent a written opinion, which the 
commissioners accepted.119  Jay’s invocation of his judicial duty estab-
lished a precedent that may have led to infrequent attendance by the 
Chief Justice at subsequent meetings of the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion.120
118 Letter from John Adams to John Jay (Mar. 21, 1792), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 159, 159-60 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1966) [hereinafter HAMIL-
TON PAPERS]. 
119 Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Mar. 23, 1792), in HAMILTON PA-
PERS, supra note 118, at 172, 172-73; Meeting of the Commissioners of the Sinking 
Fund (Mar. 26, 1792), in HAMILTON PAPERS, supra note 118, at 193, 193-94.  In declin-
ing to attend the meeting, Jay cited hazardous road conditions that might prevent his 
return to New York in time to attend Court.  Letter from John Jay to John Adams (Mar. 
23, 1792), cited in Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 142 n.91.  In fact, it 
seems possible that Jay could have attended the meeting in Philadelphia in late March 
and returned in time to open the New York circuit court on April 5—Adams’s letter 
from Philadelphia had taken only two days to reach Jay in New York.  Moreover, the 
court still could have been held in Jay’s absence, because a quorum would have been 
present.  See Circuit Court for the District of New York, in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 253, 
253 (recording the presence of three judges, including Jay, at New York circuit court in 
April 1792); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75 (deeming the presence 
of two judges sufficient to constitute a quorum). 
120 See Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 143-44 (indicating that later 
Chief Justices may have attended meetings irregularly).  Another statute, which im-
posed duties not just on the Chief Justice but on the Justices as a group, encountered 
some objections.  The Invalid Pensions Act of 1792, ch. 10, § 2, 1 Stat. 243, 244, re-
quired the judges of circuit courts—which included Supreme Court Justices riding cir-
cuit—to make an initial determination on the pension applications of Revolutionary 
War veterans.  That determination would then be subject to review by the secretary of 
war and Congress.  Id. § 4.  All of the Justices and judges who considered the statute 
found constitutional difficulties with it, although some—including Jay, while at the 
very circuit court that conflicted with the meeting of the Sinking Fund Commission—
avoided the constitutional difficulty by construing the statute to appoint them as com-
missioners.  Extract from the Minutes of the United States Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of New York (Apr. 5, 1792), in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 370, 370-72.  These judges 
were willing to entertain pension applications, in their capacity as commissioners, after 
the court had adjourned for the day.  Thus, the imposition of duties that were straight-
forwardly extrajudicial—such as the Chief Justice’s service on the Sinking Fund Com-
mission—posed no problem.  It was only when duties were imposed on judges as 
judges, and did not conform to the requirements of the Constitution, that difficulties 
arose.  Id.; Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case:  A Misinterpretation of Prece-
dent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 527, 530. 
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B.  Advisory Opinions 
The idea that the Chief Justice would have a formal role as adviser 
to the President was proposed at the Constitutional Convention in a 
number of different forms.121  These proposals reflected British cus-
tom, although opposition to them may also have stemmed from that 
very model:  Lord Mansfield, chief justice of the King’s Bench, was no-
torious on this side of the Atlantic for his advice to George III that the 
colonists should be dealt with harshly, and was generally perceived as 
a pernicious and shadowy influence on the Crown.122  While none of 
the proposals for a formal advisory role for the Chief Justice were 
adopted, the Constitution as ratified contained no explicit prohibition 
against executive requests for advice from the Chief Justice—or from 
the Court as a whole, for that matter.123  And, especially in the early 
months of his administration, President Washington routinely turned 
to Chief Justice Jay for advice. 
Until the fall of 1790, when the capital moved from Jay’s home-
town of New York to Philadelphia, Jay functioned essentially as a cabi-
net official who was valued as much for his expertise in foreign policy 
as in law.124  In the summer of 1790, for example, Washington antici-
pated an imminent foreign policy crisis:  Spain had captured some 
British ships on Nootka Sound in the Pacific Northwest, and Washing-
ton feared that Britain would use the incident as an excuse to increase 
its military presence on the American continent.  He sought advice 
from Jay, who unhesitatingly responded with a written opinion that 
blended considerations of international law and diplomacy.125
121 JAY, supra note 2, at 65-74; Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 127-
30.  One of these proposals, which would have established an “advisory council to the 
President consisting of the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and the ministers 
in charge of the various executive departments,” was originally proposed by the future 
Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth.  JAY, supra note 2, at 71-72. 
122 JAY, supra note 2, at 34-42, 71, 150. 
123 Stewart Jay suggests that the rejection of proposals for advisory councils that 
included the Chief Justice indicates only that the Framers thought it inappropriate to 
require the judges to respond to presidential requests for advice.  Id. at 73; see also 
Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities, supra note 1, at 129-30 (stating that the Convention’s 
rejection of a Council of Revision did not indicate that judges’ roles should be limited 
to deciding cases and controversies). 
124 See JAY, supra note 2, at 94-99 (pointing out that, while much of Jay’s involve-
ment in foreign policy decisions at the beginning of the Washington administration 
could be attributed to his position as interim secretary of state, that involvement did 
not end when Jefferson arrived to take up the position in March 1790); Wheeler, Extra-
judicial Activities, supra note 1, at 145-47. 
125 CASTO, supra note 2, at 71-72; JAY, supra note 2, at 95-96. 
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While Jay’s role as an adviser later diminished because he was no 
longer living at the seat of government—and because his circuit-riding 
duties kept him on the road much of the time—he continued to sup-
ply advice when asked.126  In April 1793, the President and his Cabinet 
viewed the spreading European war with alarm:  a plan of action to 
ensure American neutrality needed to be drafted immediately.  At the 
request of Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury, Jay sent 
from New York a draft of a neutrality proclamation and advice on how 
to receive the new French ambassador.127
Chief Justice Ellsworth also responded to requests for his opinions 
on various issues from the executive branch.  Only a few days after he 
became Chief Justice, he wrote a nine-page advisory opinion on legis-
lative issues surrounding the appropriation of funds to implement the 
Jay Treaty, recently negotiated by his predecessor in office.  Although 
the opinion is in the form of a letter addressed to a Connecticut Sena-
tor, the document was preserved in Washington’s own files—raising 
the possibility that it was written in response to an indirect presiden-
tial request.128  In 1798, after the infamous Sedition Act had been 
passed by Congress, Ellsworth advised Secretary of State Timothy 
Pickering—the cabinet officer who, at the time, was responsible for 
supervising the various United States attorneys—that the Act was con-
stitutional.129  And the following year, Ellsworth, having heard that 
Federalist senators were planning to reject the man President Adams 
had nominated as special envoy to France, took it upon himself to 
suggest to Adams that he appoint three envoys instead.  Adams not 
only agreed, but also appointed Ellsworth as one of the three.130
Neither Jay nor Ellsworth showed any compunction about giving 
advice, individually, on issues that might come before them on the 
bench.131  Jay, in his draft neutrality proclamation, suggested that of-
126 JAY, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
127 CASTO, supra note 2, at 74-75; JAY, supra note 2, at 117-20.  The neutrality proc-
lamation issued by Washington on April 22 was drafted by Attorney General Edmund 
Randolph.  Although the two documents bear some similarities, it is not known 
whether Randolph saw Jay’s draft. 
128 CASTO, supra note 2, at 97-98. 
129 Id. at 148-49. 
130 Id. at 118-19; infra text accompanying note 141. 
131 A different attitude prevailed when advice was requested from the Court as a 
whole.  In 1793, the Washington administration approached the Justices collectively 
for an extensive advisory opinion concerning the activities of French privateers in this 
country and their implications for American neutrality, and the Justices refused to give 
one.  Although this refusal has historically been characterized as a definitive statement 
of principle against advisory opinions, Stewart Jay has argued for a more narrow inter-
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fenders against neutrality be prosecuted, despite the fact that he him-
self might be presiding over such prosecutions.132  Similarly, Ellsworth 
advised Pickering about the constitutionality of the Sedition Act in full 
knowledge that cases involving that very question might come before 
him.133
C.  Chief Justices Abroad 
The extrajudicial activity that was viewed with the most suspicion 
by contemporaries—and which had the greatest effect on the Court as 
an institution—was the service of both Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth 
as presidential foreign envoys.  But, while opposition to these ap-
pointments was based partly on constitutional principle—or, at least, 
on conceptions of good government—the ebb and flow of objection 
indicates that it stemmed primarily from pragmatic or political con-
siderations. 
In April 1794, Washington appointed Jay envoy extraordinary to 
the Court of His Britannic Majesty.  Relations between Britain and the 
United States had deteriorated dangerously:  each country accused 
the other of obstructing important provisions of the 1783 Treaty of 
Paris, and the British had recently begun seizing American ships trad-
ing with France and the French West Indies.134  Washington’s ap-
pointment of Jay as the person to resolve the dispute made a certain 
sense:  not only did he have extensive diplomatic experience, he had 
been one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Paris.  On the other 
hand, the mission to England would take him away from his judicial 
duties—both on the Supreme Court and on circuit—for over a year. 
While much of the opposition to Jay’s appointment arose from 
the suspicion that he was too favorably inclined towards the British,135 
some of it clearly rested on antipathy towards dual office-holding.  
Aaron Burr—then a senator from New York—introduced a motion in 
the Senate objecting to Jay’s nomination on grounds of both policy 
pretation.  See generally JAY, supra note 2.  In any event, it is clear that individual Justices, 
and particularly the Chief Justice, continued to give advice to the executive after the 
1793 incident. 
132 CASTO, supra note 2, at 74-75.  Indeed, three months after Washington issued a 
neutrality proclamation, the United States prosecuted an American citizen, Gideon 
Henfield, for violating it by serving aboard a French-commissioned privateer.  See id. at 
130-35. 
133 Id. at 148-49. 
134 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 436. 
135 CASTO, supra note 2, at 89. 
 
1402 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 154: 1373 
 
and constitutionality.  To allow Supreme Court Justices simultaneously 
to hold other positions “emanating” from the executive branch would 
be “contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, and, as tending to ex-
pose them to the influence of the Executive, . . . mischievous and im-
politic.”136  And a correspondent writing in a Philadelphia newspaper 
found Jay’s nomination as envoy impossible to reconcile with “those 
principles which seem necessary in a republican government.”  The 
principle of separation of powers would be violated and the Constitu-
tion would “become a dead letter,” the correspondent argued, if the 
Chief Justice were to decide cases involving the interpretation of a 
treaty he had negotiated himself.137  But, while some senators spoke in 
support of Burr’s resolution, it was defeated seventeen to ten, and the 
Senate voted eighteen to eight to confirm Jay.138  There may actually 
have been more sentiment against dual office-holding than is appar-
ent from these votes:  the Anti-Federalist newspaper Aurora suggested 
that Jay’s supporters had maintained during debate that, if appointed 
as envoy, Jay would resign as Chief Justice.139  In any event, opposition 
to appointments such as Jay’s lingered:  in 1795, for example, a resolu-
tion was introduced in the Virginia legislature proposing a constitu-
tional amendment that would prevent federal judges from holding 
other appointments.140
Such sentiments were revived after 1799, when Ellsworth was ap-
pointed as one of three presidential envoys to France, which by that 
time had replaced Britain as the nation that posed the greatest danger 
to the United States.  Indeed, an undeclared war was raging—the 
“Quasi-War”—and, after a disastrous earlier American mission to 
France, President Adams decided the time had come for a further at-
tempt at negotiating an end to hostilities.  As noted above, Ellsworth 
himself had urged Adams to appoint a group of three special envoys 
after objections had arisen to a plan to appoint one man to the job, 
and he therefore may have seemed a logical choice.141  Moreover, al-
though Ellsworth did not have the diplomatic background that Jay 
did, he was trusted by Federalists, many of whom opposed Adams’s in-
136 1 J. EXECUTIVE PROC. SENATE 152 (1828), quoted in CASTO, supra note 2, at 89. 
137 From Correspondents, GEN. ADVERTISER (Phila.), Apr. 19, 1794, at 1.  Of course, 
this objection could have been addressed by requiring the Chief Justice to recuse him-
self in such cases. 
138 CASTO, supra note 2, at 89. 
139 Wheeler Dissertation, supra note 16, at 214. 
140 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 245. 
141 CASTO, supra note 2, at 118-19; supra text accompanying note 130. 
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tention of making peace with France, and he would therefore stand a 
better chance of being politically acceptable to a crucial faction.142
Although Federalist leaders remained hostile to the idea of the 
mission,143 Ellsworth’s nomination passed the Senate with even less 
opposition than Jay’s nomination had confronted five years earlier.144  
Like Jay, Ellsworth would be gone from the bench for over a year.145  
The relative lack of opposition to Ellsworth’s nomination was largely a 
function of politics:  the Anti-Federalists, who had been most vocal in 
opposing Jay’s mission to England, favored the idea of making peace 
with France and were therefore less inclined to raise objections of any 
kind.  In addition, Anti-Federalists knew that Ellsworth himself was ac-
tually reluctant to undertake the mission, and that this assignment 
would win him enmity rather than favor among members of his own 
party.  Therefore, one of the key arguments against judicial dual of-
fice-holding—that judges would compromise their independence be-
cause of the “lure of office”—was inapplicable to Ellsworth’s situa-
tion.146
While there is some evidence of doubts about dual office-holding 
among Federalists at the time of Ellsworth’s appointment as envoy,147 
142 See JAY, supra note 2, at 153 (“Federalist Senators were anxious to have Ells-
worth at the negotiations, given his strongly Federalist leanings.”). 
143 Despite Ellsworth’s appointment, most of the leaders of the Federalist party 
continued to hope that the “mission would end in failure and disgrace.”  JOHN C. 
MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA:  1789-1801, at 246 (1960). 
144 Ellsworth’s nomination was approved by the Senate by a vote of twenty-three to 
six.  CASTO, supra note 2, at 119.  However, the six negative votes on Ellsworth’s nomi-
nation apparently were “on account of his being Chief Justice.”  Letter from James Ire-
dell to Samuel Johnston (Feb. 28, 1799), in 3 DHSC, supra note 2, at 324, 324.  Iredell 
himself took a dim view of the appointment:  “I by no means like the practice of taking 
a Man from the exercise of one duty to perform another.”  Id.  His dismay most likely 
stemmed not from any constitutional objection, but from the greater burden of circuit 
riding that Ellsworth’s absence would impose on the other Justices. 
145 Although Ellsworth’s appointment was confirmed in February, he and his fel-
low commissioners did not actually depart for France until November 1799.  ELKINS & 
MCKITRICK, supra note 36, at 618-20; MILLER, supra note 143, at 246.  He did not re-
turn to the United States until 1801, by which time he had already resigned as Chief 
Justice.  3 DHSC, supra note 2, at 323.  His letter of resignation, sent from France in 
October 1800, reached President Adams on December 15.  Letter from Oliver Ells-
worth to John Adams (Oct. 16, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 123, 123. 
146 Wheeler Dissertation, supra note 16, at 222, 241-43. 
147 See 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 245 (quoting a pro-Federalist newspaper express-
ing concern about loss of judicial independence).  Secretary of State Timothy 
Pickering assumed that Ellsworth would resign as Chief Justice in order to take up his 
post as envoy.  See id. (quoting Pickering’s statement indicating that if Ellsworth went 
to France, he would “be called upon to quit” his position as Chief Justice). 
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it was not until a year later—when a presidential election was ap-
proaching—that true opposition surfaced.  In February 1800, the Anti-
Federalist Senator Charles Pinckney of South Carolina introduced a 
constitutional amendment that would have barred federal judges from 
holding any other federal or state office, on pain of removal from the 
bench.  Ten days later, Edward Livingston of New York—also an Anti-
Federalist—introduced a constitutional amendment in the House that 
was similar to Pinckney’s.  The following month Pinckney withdrew 
his amendment, and instead introduced a bill that would have had the 
same effect as his proposed amendment.148  In support of his bill, 
Pinckney made arguments similar to those that had been mounted 
against Jay’s appointment in 1794:  the executive should not be able to 
compromise judicial independence by dangling the lure of “addi-
tional offices and emoluments,” nor should judges violate the princi-
ple of separation of powers by negotiating treaties which they might 
be called upon to interpret in their judicial capacities.  Furthermore, 
Pinckney urged, judges—and particularly the Chief Justice—should 
not be absent from the United States for extended periods:  not only 
would it impose an unfair share of duties on the remaining Justices, 
but it would also remove the one officer who was to preside in case of 
a presidential impeachment.149  Pinckney’s bill was narrowly defeated 
by a vote of twelve to fourteen.150
Negative commentary about the appointment of Chief Justices as 
presidential envoys continued to appear in the press, but—like the 
election-year grandstanding in Congress—the opposition had a parti-
san cast.  In June 1800, the virulently Anti-Federalist Philadelphia 
Aurora complained that the “wasteful and extravagant—if not com-
pletely corrupt” appointments of Jay and Ellsworth had induced other 
federal judges to attempt to curry favor with the Adams administration 
by bringing in convictions under the Sedition Act.151  That August, 
148 Id. at 246-48.  Livingston’s amendment differed from Pinckney’s in that it 
would have barred judges from holding other federal offices until six months after 
their resignations from the judiciary.  Id. 
149 Charles Pinckney’s Speech to the United States Senate, AURORA (Phila.), Mar. 5, 1800, 
reprinted in 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 630, 630-36. 
150 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 246.  Members of the Senate committee that had re-
ported the bill led the opposition, on the grounds that the bill was unconstitutional—
apparently reasoning that it violated the Article III guarantee of life tenure during 
good behavior for judges.  In addition, the Senators argued that the bill would “oper-
ate as a censure” on President Adams for having appointed Ellsworth, and on the Sen-
ate for having confirmed him.  In Senate, AURORA (Phila.), Apr. 7, 1800. 
151 The Judiciary, AURORA (Phila.), June 16, 1800, reprinted in 4 DHSC, supra note 2, 
at 653, 653-56. 
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when the opening of the Supreme Court was delayed for several days 
because of the lack of a quorum—caused partly by Ellsworth’s absence 
in France—the Aurora mocked the idea that “no man in the United 
States” could have negotiated a treaty with the French but Ellsworth, 
and criticized “[t]he suspension of the business of the highest court of 
judicature in the United States, to allow a Chief Justice to add NINE 
THOUSAND DOLLARS a year to his salary.”152  And in 1801, when the 
chief justiceship was again vacant, the Aurora dismissed the position as 
a “sinecure,” on the evidence “that in one case the duties were dis-
charged by one person who resided at the same time in England; and 
by another during a year’s residence in France.”153
As the other Justices themselves knew, however, the position of 
Chief Justice was far from a sinecure, and the absence of the Chief was 
sorely felt—if for no other reason than that the Justices who were left 
behind had to shoulder a greater share of the burden of circuit rid-
ing.154  There was, as well, at least some symbolic value in the presence 
of the Chief Justice.  “Much of the dignity of the Court is lost by the 
absence of the Chief Justice,” wrote one observer at the Court’s Feb-
ruary 1795 session, when Jay was still in England.155  And, as will be dis-
cussed below, there is the question of how much influence within the 
Court Jay and Ellsworth lost by their long absences. 
It may seem inconsistent that, in 1792, Jay refused to attend a 
meeting of the Sinking Fund Commission in order to hold a circuit 
court term that lasted only five days, and which could have conducted 
its business without him,156 and yet, two years later, he accepted an 
152 AURORA (Phila.), Aug. 9, 1800, reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 895, 895; 
Judges of the Courts of the United States, AURORA (Phila.), Aug. 11, 1800, reprinted in 1 
DHSC, supra note 2, at 896, 896.  The Aurora’s comments in both June and August 
were premised on the idea that Jay and Ellsworth had drawn dual salaries while hold-
ing their dual offices.  In May 1800, Congress had provided that any minister plenipo-
tentiary should be allowed up to $9000 a year for services and expenses.  Act of May 10, 
1800, ch. 56, § 1, 2 Stat. 78, 78.  But Ellsworth’s request to receive two salaries was ap-
parently refused by the Jefferson administration.  4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 245 n.8. 
153 AURORA (Phila.), Jan. 8, 1801, reprinted in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 913, 913-14. 
154 See, e.g., Letter from John Jay to Sarah Jay (Apr. 19, 1794), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 447, 447-48 (noting that because Jay was about to depart, Paterson would 
complete the circuit that Jay was riding); Letter from James Wilson to William Cushing 
(Apr. 27, 1794), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 450, 450 (discussing the reassignment of 
the remainder of Jay’s circuit); Letter from William Cushing to William Paterson ( July 
20, 1794), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 477, 477 (noting that while Jay was supposed to 
attend court for Cushing at New York, he would not be able to do so). 
155 Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Feb. 7, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 752, 752. 
156 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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appointment that took him away from his judicial duties for an entire 
year.  But, in declining to attend the Sinking Fund meeting, Jay had 
noted that his priorities might be “inverted, if only the Importance of 
the occasion was considered.”157  The question Jay was asked to resolve 
by the Sinking Fund commissioners was, as he said, “a [mere] law 
Question,” which he could address in a written opinion.158  In con-
trast, Jay—and, presumably, Ellsworth as well—felt that the impor-
tance of the foreign missions which the President himself had asked 
them to undertake justified their extended absences from the 
bench.159
In both cases—although for different reasons—those absences ul-
timately became permanent.  Jay returned to the United States to dis-
cover that he had been elected governor of New York in absentia.160  
For Ellsworth, the strain of his mission to France had led to such ill 
health that he felt he could no longer continue in the position of 
Chief Justice.161
IV.  THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE WITHIN THE COURT 
The aspect of the Chief Justice’s role that appears most salient to 
the modern eye—as a spokesman for and unifying force on the Court 
itself, and the prime shaper of its jurisprudence—is perhaps the most 
difficult for the historian of the early Court to assess.  Few documents 
remain (if, indeed, they ever existed) that shed light on the Court’s 
internal dynamics, and it is far from clear that contemporaries would 
have expected the Chief Justice to function as the leader of the Court 
in this way. 
157 Letter from John Jay to Alexander Hamilton (Mar. 23, 1792), in 11 HAMILTON 
PAPERS, supra note 118, at 172, 172-73. 
158 Id. 
159 As Chief Justice, John Marshall scrupulously avoided extrajudicial service.  Well 
aware of the criticism of Jay’s and Ellsworth’s foreign missions, he did not want to pro-
vide those who were hostile to the federal judiciary with any ammunition against him 
or the Court.  In addition, of course, the Jeffersonians were unlikely to call on Mar-
shall—a Federalist—for extrajudicial advice.  See Wheeler Dissertation, supra note 16, at 
202-05, 224-27. 
160 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 7; Letter from John Jay to George Washington ( June 
29, 1795), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 13, 13. 
161 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 118; Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to John Adams (Oct. 
16, 1800), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 123, 123. 
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A.  Factors Limiting the Chief Justice’s Influence 
The model of an influential Chief Justice—for a twenty-first-
century observer—presupposes a number of conditions, including 
that the Justices spend a sufficient amount of time together to develop 
an atmosphere of collegiality and that the Chief Justice is a charis-
matic persuader who makes his presence strongly felt. 
These conditions, for the most part, simply did not obtain in the 
1790s.  The Justices met only twice a year—in February and August—
and usually for only a week or two at a time, although the sessions 
grew longer as the years progressed.  During their stay in the nation’s 
capital, the Justices apparently did not share a boarding house, as they 
did in later years—for some, in fact, the capital was their home.162
While relations among the Justices were generally cordial and re-
spectful,163 there appears to have been only one genuine friendship, 
that between Justices Iredell and Wilson.164  In the earliest years, when 
two Justices were required on each circuit, Justices who rode circuit 
together had a greater opportunity to form bonds—although, to their 
minds, the disadvantages of circuit riding greatly outweighed this pu-
tative advantage.  In any event, after the enactment of the Judiciary 
Act of 1793,165 which changed the quorum requirement so that only 
one Justice was needed at a circuit court, the Justices generally rode 
circuit alone. 
As for the presence of the Chief at Court sessions, he was, in fact, 
often absent.  In addition to the two Terms that Jay and Ellsworth 
each missed because of service abroad, there were absences for health 
162 John Jay lived in New York, where the Court first met, and James Iredell had 
moved there from North Carolina.  When the Court relocated to Philadelphia, Iredell 
followed, though he ultimately moved back to North Carolina in 1793.  James Wilson 
also lived in Philadelphia. 
163 The only real source of conflict was the circuit-riding system, which weighed 
most heavily on Justice Iredell.  See, e.g., Letter from James Iredell to John Jay, William 
Cushing, & James Wilson (Feb. 11, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 131, 131-35 
(complaining that he was assigned the longest and most arduous circuit at a meeting 
of the Justices that he did not attend); infra text accompanying note 185. 
164 It is clear from their correspondence that Iredell and Wilson were friends.  See, 
e.g., Letter from James Iredell to James Wilson (Aug. 20, 1796), in 3 DHSC, supra note 
2, at 133, 133-34 (“I never expect to hear in a letter from you how you or your Family 
are But I assure you I shall always be solicitous to know . . . .”).  In 1798, Wilson took 
refuge from his creditors in Edenton, North Carolina, where Iredell and his family 
lived.  After Wilson’s death, the Iredells took in his penniless widow, Hannah.  Id. at 
238-39; Letter from James Iredell to Bird Wilson (Sept. 1, 1798), in 3 DHSC, supra note 
2, at 287, 287-88 & n.3. 
165 Ch. 22, § 1, 1 Stat. 333, 333-34; 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 203. 
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or other reasons.  Jay missed the February 1792 Term because of his 
wife’s pregnancy and his own precarious state of health.166  Rutledge 
missed the beginning of his first and only session as Chief Justice in 
August 1795 because he received his commission too late to allow him 
to arrive on time.167  Ellsworth missed all but the last day of the Febru-
ary 1796 Term because he was not appointed as Chief Justice until the 
Term was half over,168 and he missed all of the February Terms in 
1797 and 1798 because of illness.169
Even if the Chief Justices had attended every Court session, it is 
not clear that they would have become leaders of the Court in the 
modern sense.  Both Jay and Ellsworth had a certain commanding 
presence, to judge from their portraits and the accounts of contempo-
raries, and both had experience in the art of persuasion—Jay as a dip-
lomat and Ellsworth as a legislator.  But neither was a hail-fellow-well-
met, back-slapping type.  Both men took a stern and bleakly religious 
view of life,170 and it is hard to imagine either of them good-naturedly 
cajoling their brethren into adopting a particular position on a case in 
the manner of, say, a John Marshall or an Earl Warren.171  Rather, to 
the extent that they led, they most likely did so by sheer force of char-
acter and the prestige attached to their post. 
B.  The Chief Justice as a Leader on Administrative Issues 
1.  Rulemaking 
In order for the Court to function, it was necessary to establish 
certain procedural rules that had been overlooked by Congress.  At 
the Court’s first Term, in February 1790, the Justices issued several 
166 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 196 n.108. 
167 Id. at 244 n.191. 
168 Ellsworth was confirmed by the Senate on March 4, 1796, but did not take his 
oath until March 8.  Id. at 120-22.  He did not attend Court for the remainder of the 
session because argument on some of the cases had preceded his appointment, but he 
was present on the last day, March 14, to adjourn the Court until the next session.  Id. 
at 270 n.214. 
169 Id. at 283 n.248, 298 n.288.  These absences—aside from those attributable to 
foreign service—were fairly typical.  Virtually all the Associate Justices missed occa-
sional Terms of the Court because of illness or difficulties in traveling. 
170 See VanBurkleo, supra note 29, at 32-35 (discussing how Jay approached religion 
and politics in his life); Casto, supra note 80, at 293-96 (“[H]e was a deeply religious 
individual who cleaved to his parents’ and teachers’ strict Calvinism throughout his 
life.”). 
171 See CASTO, supra note 2, at 111-12 (describing Marshall and Warren as “person-
able leaders”). 
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such rules—including one that, following English practice, recognized 
a distinction between “Counsellors” and “Attornies”—with Chief Jus-
tice Jay presiding.172  Two years later, another significant, British-
influenced rule was announced by the Chief Justice, speaking for the 
Court as a whole:  from then on the practice of the courts of King’s 
Bench and Chancery would be adopted as “affording outlines for the 
practice of this Court.”173
But the Chief Justice’s presence was clearly not seen as essential to 
an exercise of the Court’s rulemaking power.  In February 1795, with 
Jay absent in England and Cushing presiding as senior Associate Jus-
tice, the Justices gave notice to “the Gentlemen of the Bar, that, here-
after, they will expect to be furnished with a statement, of the material 
points of the Case, from the Counsel on each side of a cause.”174  This 
was apparently an attempt to require the filing of a document akin to 
a modern legal brief. 
2.  Communications to Other Branches on 
Administrative Matters 
When difficulties arose in the judicial system during the 1790s that 
could be corrected only by the legislative or executive branch—a fairly 
frequent occurrence, given the experimental nature of the whole en-
deavor—the Chief Justice did not have an exclusive role as the person 
charged with seeking a remedy.  While the Chief Justice did on occa-
sion approach the executive or the legislative branch,175 either for-
172 Supreme Court Fine Minutes, Feb. 5, 1790, in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 169, 
177.  Attorneys could file motions and handle paperwork, but counselors would do the 
actual pleading of cases.  6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 2-3.  The Court also ordered, among 
other things, that process issuing out of the Court would run in the name of “the 
President of the United States.”  Id. at 2.  The issuance of these rules was, in addition to 
the presentation of letters patent by the Justices and the admission of lawyers to the 
Supreme Court bar, the only business conducted by the Court during its first Term. 
173 Supreme Court Fine Minutes, Aug. 8, 1792, in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 169, 
203.  Jay announced the rule in response to a motion by the attorney general, and it 
was apparently intended to confirm the Court’s power to make rules under a recently 
enacted statute.  See id. at 203 n.129. 
174 Supreme Court Fine Minutes, Feb. 4, 1795, in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 169, 
233. 
175 See, e.g., Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington 
(Sept. 13, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 89, 89-91 (regarding circuit riding); Let-
ter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 22, 1793), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 434, 434-
35 (suggesting that the Pennsylvania circuit court sit in only one location). 
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mally or informally, other Justices—and Justice Iredell in particular—
sometimes took the initiative as well.176
The President himself encouraged this sort of direct communica-
tion.  In April 1790, shortly before the Justices were to embark on 
their first circuits, George Washington wrote to them as a group in-
forming them that he would welcome “such Information and Re-
marks” on any imperfections in the new judicial system as might occur 
to them.177  Two years later, Justice Iredell wrote to Washington con-
cerning two procedural problems that had come to his attention and 
that had not yet been addressed by Congress.  He introduced his re-
marks by alluding to the President’s letter of April 1790, and stating 
that he presumed it was “not only proper” for “a single Judge” to 
communicate such matters when he encountered them, but in fact 
“his express duty.”178
From the Justices’ perspective, the most pressing matter requiring 
legislative attention was that of circuit riding.  The Judiciary Act of 
1789 had created circuit courts but no circuit judges:  in another bor-
rowing from British and colonial custom,179 circuit courts were to be 
held by the local district judge and two—or, after 1793, one—
176 Four Justices ( Jay, Cushing, Wilson, and Blair) and two federal district judges 
( James Duane and Richard Peters) wrote to President Washington to protest the du-
ties allotted to circuit judges under the Invalid Pensions Act of 1792.  JAY, supra note 2, 
at 106-07; see also discussion supra note 120; 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 33-35; Letter from 
Samuel Sewall to William Cushing (Feb. 25, 1800), in 4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 628, 628 
(describing a consultation with three Justices on a pending judiciary bill).  Communi-
cation with legislators was not limited to Supreme Court Justices; Rhode Island District 
Court Judge Henry Marchant “tirelessly badgered Congress, through his friends, to 
raise his salary.”  Maeva Marcus & Emily Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the 
New Federal System, 1789-1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS:  TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL 
COMITY 31, 46 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).  Marcus and Van Tassel conclude that 
“the practice of informal lobbying or conferring between the two branches was, if not 
commonplace, then certainly not unusual during the formative decade of the U.S. 
constitutional system.”  Id. 
177 Letter from George Washington to the Justices of the Supreme Court (Apr. 3, 
1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 21, 21.  Washington apparently sent Jay the letter, 
and he forwarded copies to the Associate Justices.  Id. at 21 note. 
178 Letter from James Iredell to George Washington (Feb. 23, 1792), in 2 DHSC, 
supra note 2, at 239, 239.  While one of the problems described by Iredell had oc-
curred at a circuit court where he was the only Justice present, the other had arisen in 
a case that reached the Supreme Court and was well known to the other Justices, in-
cluding Jay.  Washington circulated Iredell’s letter to three cabinet members and held 
a cabinet meeting to discuss it.  Iredell’s letter was then forwarded to Attorney General 
Edmund Randolph.  Id. at 242 note; Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 176, at 44-45. 
179 GOEBEL, supra note 2, at 472; William E. Nelson, The Historical Foundations of the 
American Judiciary, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 3, 5 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire 
eds., 2005). 
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traveling Supreme Court Justices.  The states were divided into three 
circuits—Eastern, Middle, and Southern—and circuit courts were to 
be held in the spring and the fall.  From the very beginning, Justices 
not only complained about having to spend months traveling over 
hazardous roads but also raised constitutional and jurisprudential ob-
jections to the system, and President Washington promised that it was 
only a temporary arrangement.180  But reform was very slow in com-
ing.181
Jay took the lead initially in seeking an end to circuit riding:  pur-
suant to an agreement reached at the Court’s second session in Au-
gust 1790, the Chief Justice drafted and circulated a letter to George 
Washington suggesting the unconstitutionality of the Justices’ sitting 
in review on cases they had decided as circuit judges.182  Nothing was 
done, however, and Jay—despite his own strong antipathy towards cir-
cuit-riding duty183—felt the need to proceed cautiously in light of hos-
tility towards the federal judiciary in some quarters:  “The Federal 
Courts have Enemies in all who fear their Influence on State Objects,” 
he wrote to New York senator Rufus King.  “[I]t is to be wished that 
their Defects should be corrected quietly.”184
Into the breach stepped James Iredell, who not only suffered the 
most under the circuit-riding system, but also was fortunate in having 
180 For example, when one of Washington’s original appointees to the Court, 
Robert H. Harrison, expressed reservations about accepting the appointment because 
of the duties of circuit riding, Washington assured him that “a change in the system is 
contemplated.”  Letter from Robert H. Harrison to George Washington (Oct. 27, 
1789), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 36, 36-37; Letter from George Washington to Robert 
H. Harrison (Nov. 25, 1789), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 10, 10.  After setting out to 
attend the first meeting of the Supreme Court, but then turning back because he fell 
ill, Harrison resigned.  Letter from Robert H. Harrison to George Washington ( Jan. 
21, 1790), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 42, 42. 
181 Circuit riding continued throughout the 1790s.  It was temporarily abolished by 
the Judiciary Act of 1801, which was repealed in 1802, but not permanently abolished 
until 1891.  4 DHSC, supra note 2, at 127, 294-95. 
182 Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Sept. 13, 
1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 89, 89-91.  It is not known whether the letter was 
ever sent to Washington.  Id. at 92 n.1. 
183 Circuit riding was responsible for Jay’s willingness to allow his name to be put 
forward for the governorship of New York in 1792 and his acceptance of that office in 
1795.  JAY, supra note 2, at 161-62.  It was also probably responsible for his refusal to 
serve again as Chief Justice in 1801.  See Letter from John Jay to John Adams (Jan. 2, 
1801), in 1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 146, 146-47 (complaining that expected reforms to 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 had not been made, despite “Remonstrances of the Judges on 
this important Subject”). 
184 Letter from John Jay to Rufus King (Dec. 22, 1793), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 
434, 434-35; see also JAY, supra note 2, at 161-62. 
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a brother-in-law who was a senator.185  Iredell drafted at least two 
pieces of legislation modifying the circuit court system, both of which 
were introduced by his brother-in-law, Samuel Johnston.186  He also 
drafted a second letter protesting the system, which was signed by all 
six Justices, sent to Washington, and forwarded to Congress.187  Ire-
dell’s efforts were only partially successful, but had the matter been 
left entirely to Jay, it seems likely that even less would have been ac-
complished. 
C.  From Seriatim Opinions to Opinions of the Court 
The Court of the early 1790s frequently delivered its opinions se-
riatim—with the Justices reading their opinions individually from the 
bench, beginning with the most junior Justice and ending with the 
Chief—rather than issuing an opinion of the Court.  While some his-
torians have traced this practice to English common-law custom,188  in 
fact the Court of King’s Bench had a somewhat different procedure 
under Lord Mansfield, who served as its chief justice from 1756 to 
185 At an August 1790 meeting of the Justices held when Iredell was not present, 
he was permanently assigned to the Southern Circuit, which was by far the longest and 
most arduous of the three.  2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 7. 
186 See Marcus & Van Tassel, supra note 176, at 47 n.51 (noting that Iredell drafted 
a bill, enacted in 1790, changing the times of southern circuit courts to make them 
more convenient for whoever rode the southern circuit); 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 248 
n.6 (noting that Iredell drafted the bill that became the Circuit Court Act of 1792, al-
tering the times of holding some circuit courts and providing for a rotation of circuit 
assignments). 
187 Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington (Aug. 9, 
1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 288, 288-89; see also Letter from the Justices of the 
Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States (Aug. 9, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 289, 289-90 & note (noting that two drafts in Iredell’s handwriting survive).  
Iredell also proposed a plan whereby each Justice would give up $500 of his salary in 
exchange for an end to circuit riding, but Jay used his influence as Chief Justice to dis-
suade Iredell from presenting the plan to Congress.  Letter from John Jay to James 
Iredell (Mar. 19, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 248, 248-49; Marcus & Van Tassel, 
supra note 176, at 48. 
 Yet a third letter protesting the circuit-riding system was sent to Washington by the 
Justices in February 1794.  Letter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to George 
Washington (Feb. 18, 1794), in 2 DHSC, supra note 2, at 442.  The Justice responsible 
for drafting this letter is unknown, but it could not have been Iredell, who was too ill to 
attend the Court’s February 1794 session.  Washington forwarded the letter to Con-
gress, but there was no immediate legislative response.  Letter from the Justices of the 
Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States (Feb. 18, 1794), in 2 DHSC, supra 
note 2, at 443, 443-44, note & nn.1-4. 
188 See, e.g., CASTO, supra note 2, at 110; HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 
382. 
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1786.  The court had no fixed rule governing the delivery of opinions, 
but in most cases Mansfield would deliver a unanimous “resolution” of 
the court.  On occasion—especially if there was disagreement on the 
bench—the Justices would deliver their opinions seriatim.  Unlike the 
practice on the American Supreme Court, however, Mansfield would 
generally deliver his opinion first, not last.189
The actual origin of the Supreme Court’s seriatim practice is 
something of a mystery—perhaps the Court was following the model 
of some colonial or state courts—but in any event, it is obvious that 
the use of seriatim opinions limited the Chief Justice’s ability to take 
the Court in any particular direction.  In addition, the Court’s holding 
was sometimes unclear because of variations in the reasoning of Jus-
tices who had reached the same result.  Chief Justice Marshall is gen-
erally credited with introducing the system of resolving almost all 
cases by means of a unanimous “opinion of the Court,” thus greatly 
augmenting the Court’s influence.190  But a study of the Supreme 
Court’s reported decisions in the 1790s reveals that Marshall only so-
lidified the transition from seriatim opinions to opinions of the Court; 
he did not introduce the idea. 
Any attempt to analyze the Supreme Court’s methods of issuing 
opinions in the 1790s must be tempered by the realization that Alex-
ander James Dallas, who compiled reports of the Court’s decisions in 
this period, was not an official reporter of the Court.  Dallas, who was 
also an active member of the Supreme Court bar at the time and was 
publishing reports of decisions of the Supreme Court and other 
courts in Pennsylvania more or less as a sideline, sometimes made mis-
takes, and did not always have access to written versions of the opin-
ions the Justices delivered orally in Court.191  That having been said, it 
189 Telephone Interview with James Oldham, St. Thomas More Professor of Law 
and Legal History, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. (Nov. 9, 2005); see, e.g., Foxcroft v. Dev-
onshire, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 638, 639 (K.B.) (explaining the resolution of the court); 
Goss v. Withers, (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 511, 517 (K.B.) (delivering the resolution of the 
court); Bright v. Eynon, (1757) 97 Eng. Rep. 365, 366-69 (K.B.) (transcribing Mans-
field’s opinion, which concluded, “These are my sentiments:  my brothers will judge 
whether I am right, or not,” and indicating that other justices delivered concurring 
opinions). 
190 See, e.g., HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 382-83. 
191 Dallas sometimes asked the Justices for copies of their opinions.  In 1796, as he 
was preparing the second volume of his reports for publication (his first volume had 
included no Supreme Court reports), Dallas wrote to Justices Cushing and Paterson—
and perhaps others as well—seeking copies of their opinions in five cases that had re-
cently been decided, “[i]n order,” as he put it, “to render the work more perfect, than 
my own notes can possibly permit.”  Letter from Alexander J. Dallas to William Cush-
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is nevertheless possible to venture some conclusions.  In the Supreme 
Court under Chief Justice Jay, more important cases were generally 
dealt with in seriatim opinions, and briefer, unattributed opinions or 
decrees were labeled by Dallas as being “by the Court.”192  Neverthe-
less, there were signs that the Chief Justice occupied a special role in 
regard to the delivery of opinions.  In one case, the first two opinions 
given by Dallas are essentially dissents by individual Justices, and the 
third, although not labeled an “opinion of the Court,” is by Jay, speak-
ing for a majority of the Court.193  On another occasion—that of the 
first jury trial ever held in the Supreme Court—Jay delivered a charge 
to the jury, making it clear that he was speaking for the Court as a 
whole.194  And in yet another case, when Jay was absent, the senior As-
sociate Justice present, James Wilson, delivered the lone opinion—an 
ing (Oct. 1, 1796), in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 647, 647-48 & n.7.  But on other occa-
sions Dallas merely summarized or even omitted opinions.  In one case, Olney v. Arnold, 
he stated that the Chief Justice delivered an “opinion of the court,” but failed to print 
the opinion itself.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308, 318 (1796).  In another, Del Col v. Arnold, he 
reported, “The Court delivered, at different times, the following opinions,” and then 
summarized the Court’s holdings on four “points” without giving any Justices’ names 
or opinions.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333, 334-35 (1796).  But an opinion by Justice William 
Paterson survives among Paterson’s papers; presumably other Justices issued separate 
opinions in the case as well.  See William Paterson’s Supreme Court Opinion (Aug. 11, 
1796), in 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 680, 680-82 (reproducing a draft of Justice Pater-
son’s opinion in Del Col v. Arnold, found in his private papers). 
192 For seriatim opinions in more significant cases, see, for example, Penhallow v. 
Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 79 (1795); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 
(1793); Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford I), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792).  In one 
case, Dallas said, “The Court delivered their opinion to the following effect,” and then 
published a series of seriatim opinions.  Bingham v. Cabot (Bingham I), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
19, 32 (1795).  For brief opinions or orders in other cases, see, for example, United 
States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 53 (1795) (“By the Court:  We are clearly and 
unanimously of opinion . . . .”); Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 402 (1791) 
(“The Court granted the rule in the following terms . . . .”); West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 401, 401 (1791) (“The Court were unanimously of opinion . . . .”); Vanstophorst 
v. Maryland, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401, 401 (1791) (resolving the case “By the Court”).  At 
least one opinion during this period, Oswald v. New York, is referred to as “per curiam” 
in the Court’s own rough minutes.  Supreme Court Original Minutes, Feb. 14, 1792, in 
1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 333, 355.  The unsigned opinions or decrees were generally 
unanimous, but there were exceptions.  In one ruling labeled as being “By the Court,” 
Dallas observed in a footnote that Justice Cushing “did not seem to coincide in this 
opinion, but the other three Judges [who were present] were decided.”  Bingham I, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 38 n.*. 
193 Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford II), 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 418 (1793) . 
194 Georgia v. Brailsford (Brailsford III), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 3-5 (1794). 
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opinion that Dallas left unlabeled, but that was apparently on behalf 
of the entire Court.195
There was, in addition, one important case in which Jay ensured 
that the Court would speak with one voice.  In Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 
a politically sensitive case involving French privateering, the Court is-
sued a decree described by Dallas as the “unanimous opinion” of the 
Justices.196  The manuscript copy of the decree shows that the wording 
was changed to underscore the certainty and finality of an opinion 
that was sure to provoke controversy:  for example, the opening sen-
tence of the decree originally began, “It appears [to us].”  That lan-
guage was crossed out and replaced with, “This Court being decidedly 
of opinion.”  Although the manuscript is in the hand of the Supreme 
Court’s clerk, Samuel Bayard, he would not have made such changes 
on his own initiative; presumably the changes were ordered by Jay, 
who had written the draft of the decree himself.197
While Jay was thus clearly capable of pushing the Court in a uni-
fied direction when he felt it was necessary, it was Oliver Ellsworth 
who began to institutionalize the use of “opinions of the Court”—a 
description that was never used by Dallas during Jay’s tenure, but 
which appears no fewer than eleven times in Dallas’s reports after 
Ellsworth became Chief Justice in 1796.198  These opinions varied from 
short decrees containing little reasoning to fairly elaborate arguments 
extending over several pages, and were sometimes followed, as some 
of the seriatim opinions had been, by an order bearing the heading, 
“by the Court.”  Opinions of the Court were usually unanimous, but 
195 United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17, 18 (1795).  Jay was absent be-
cause he was serving as an envoy to France, and Cushing was absent because of illness, 
leaving Wilson as the senior Associate Justice present.  1 DHSC, supra note 2, at 238-40 
& n.178. 
196 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) (“Jay, Chief Justice, proceeded to deliver the follow-
ing unanimous opinion.”). 
197 Decree of the Supreme Court (Feb. 18, 1794), in 6 DHSC, supra note 2, at 347, 
347-49. 
198 The phrase appears in Clarke v. Russel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 415, 424 (1799); Sims v. 
Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 456 (1799); New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 2 
(1799); Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799); Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 401, 407 (1798); Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 356 (1797) (not-
ing that Wilson, as senior Associate Justice because of Ellsworth’s absence and Cush-
ing’s apparent recusal, “delivered the opinion of the court”); Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 365, 366-67 (1797); Hills v. Ross, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 331, 332 (1796); Wiscart v. 
Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 324, 330 (1796) (giving one unanimous “opinion of the 
court” and one nonunanimous, and on another issue, giving another “opinion of the 
court”); Olney v. Arnold, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 308, 318 (1796) (opinion not published); 
Cotton v. Wallace, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 302, 304 (1796). 
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on occasion other Justices delivered concurring or dissenting opin-
ions.199  William Casto has concluded that in issuing opinions of the 
Court, Ellsworth was drawing on his experience as a judge on the 
Connecticut Superior Court in the 1780s.  A Connecticut statute in 
force at the time required that each judge give his opinion seriatim, 
but in fact the superior court “adopted an almost uniform practice of 
writing majority and dissenting opinions.”200  In any event, it is clearly 
inaccurate to say—as one of the leading historians of the Marshall 
Court has—that the use of an “opinion of the Court” under Ellsworth 
was only a “limited trend,” and that such opinions were “brief per cu-
riam[s],” which were “never utilized in matters of complexity or of 
major substantive concern.”201  In fact, this characterization aptly de-
scribes the use of “By the Court” opinions under Jay, but not “opin-
ions of the Court” under Ellsworth. 
True, the practice was not yet uniform:  in at least one case, and 
possibly two, seriatim opinions were used when Ellsworth was present, 
for reasons that are not clear.202  And in two instances in which Ells-
worth was present but did not participate in the decision, the Justices 
delivered their opinions seriatim.203  But it was only when Ellsworth 
was absent from the bench that the “opinion of the Court” virtually 
disappeared:  in February 1797, with Ellsworth absent because of ill-
ness, one case—Brown v. Van Braam—was resolved by an opinion of 
the Court, delivered by Justice Wilson,204 apparently because Justice 
199 In Wiscart v. Dauchy, Ellsworth delivered an opinion of the Court that was 
unanimous on one point but not unanimous on the second.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 321.  
This was followed by a dissent on the second point by Justice Wilson, along with a 
lengthy response from Ellsworth.  Id. at 324-30.  In Wilson v. Daniel, there was an opin-
ion of the Court by Ellsworth, a dissent by Justice Iredell, a concurrence by Justice 
Chase, and finally a response from Ellsworth.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 404-08.  In Sims v. Ir-
vine, there was a concurrence by Iredell.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 457. 
200 CASTO, supra note 2, at 110. 
201 HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 3, pt. 2, at 383 (expressing Johnson’s views). 
202 In Fenemore v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 357, 364 (1797), the Justices deliv-
ered their opinions seriatim, with Ellsworth going last.  The other possible case falling 
into this category is Del Col v. Arnold, in which Dallas did not specify whether opinions 
were given seriatim.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 333 (1796).  The discovery of an unpublished 
opinion in the case by Justice Paterson suggests, however, that they were.  See supra 
note 191. 
203 See Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 412 (1799) (addressing a land dis-
pute between New York and Connecticut, and noting that Ellsworth, a Connecticut 
citizen, recused himself “on account of the interest of Connecticut”); Calder v. Bull, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (using seriatim opinions where Ellsworth had been absent 
when the case was argued the previous Term). 
204 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 356 (1797). 
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Cushing recused himself on the grounds that he had decided the case 
in the circuit court.205  The other cases that Term were decided either 
seriatim or by unattributed decrees.206  In February 1798, when Ells-
worth was again ill, Dallas’s reports are sketchy, but, although the four 
cases he reported were all apparently decided unanimously, no opin-
ions appear as “opinions of the Court.”207  And in both the February 
and August Terms of 1800—when Ellsworth was away in France—the 
cases were either decided seriatim or else by a brief order headed “by 
the Court.”208  In a case decided in August 1800, Justice Chase ex-
pressed surprise that the Justices were delivering their opinions seria-
tim:  “[T]he Judges agreeing unanimously in their opinion,” he said, 
“I presumed that the sense of the Court would have been delivered by 
the president.”209  Leaving aside the fact that opinions of the Court de-
livered by “the president”—the Chief Justice or senior Associate—
were not limited to those that were unanimous, and the fact that the 
Justices had decided a unanimous case by means of seriatim opinions 
the previous Term,210 Chase’s comment indicates that the practice of 
issuing opinions of the Court had become fairly well institutionalized 
by 1800. 
Why did the Justices slide back to their old seriatim habits when 
Ellsworth was away?  Were they resistant, perhaps, to this attempted 
innovation?  Chase’s remark would seem to indicate the opposite.  Al-
though it is impossible to arrive at a definitive answer, the problem 
205 7 DHSC, supra note 2, at 802 n.22. 
206 Jennings v. The Brig Perseverance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 336 (1797); Huger v. South 
Carolina, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 339 (1797); Clerke v. Harwood, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 342 (1797).  
In Jennings, Dallas reported what he called a “representation” by Justice Paterson, in 
which the Court “concur[red]”; in addition, Dallas reported a one-sentence statement 
by Justice Chase, which he referred to as an “opinion.”  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 337.  Nei-
ther, however, is characterized as an “opinion of the Court.” 
207 Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 369 (1798) (Dallas giving the date of deci-
sion as 1797); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798); Bingham v. Cabot 
(Bingham II), 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798); Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 384 
(1798). 
208 There are a few ambiguous reports in relatively insignificant cases.  In Ruther-
ford v. Fisher, the only opinion given is a one-paragraph statement by Justice Chase, fol-
lowed by an order headed “by the Court.”  4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 22, 22 (1800).  In Blaine v. 
Ship Charles Carter, Dallas merely said, “the Court decided . . . .”  4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 22, 22 
(1800).  And in Priestman v. United States, Dallas reported, “the Judges briefly delivered 
their opinions, seriatim, concurring in the following result.”  4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 28, 34 
(1800).  Rather than publishing the opinions, he followed this statement with a con-
clusory paragraph headed “by the Court.”  Id. 
209 Bas v. Tingey, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800). 
210 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800). 
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may have lain with the presence of William Cushing.  As the senior As-
sociate Justice, Cushing would have been the person charged with the 
responsibility of delivering an opinion of the Court in Ellsworth’s ab-
sence.  But it was generally agreed that Cushing’s abilities as a judge 
had faded considerably.211  Perhaps he was either unwilling or unable 
to assume the task of writing for the Court as a whole—or perhaps his 
fellow Justices were reluctant to entrust him with this responsibility.  
And it would have been awkward to bypass Cushing in order to assign 
the opinion to the next most senior Associate Justice.  This theory is 
borne out by the fact that on the one occasion that an opinion of the 
Court was delivered in Ellsworth’s absence, Cushing had recused him-
self, leaving Wilson free to deliver an opinion on behalf of the 
Court.212  In any event, it seems likely that if Ellsworth had remained 
on the bench rather than accepting an appointment as presidential 
envoy to France, he, rather than Marshall, would have been seen as 
the father of the “opinion of the Court.” 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of the Supreme Court in the 1790s—like that of 
the rest of the nation—was “an extended encounter with firstness.”213  
Not only was virtually every case a case of first impression, but the very 
structure and role of the Court itself—and that of its Chief Justice—
was evolving through a process of trial and error.  Initially, the role of 
Chief Justice retained vestiges of the advisory role played by high mag-
istrates in the British and colonial tradition; the Framers of the Con-
stitution may have viewed the influence of a Chief Justice such as Lord 
Mansfield with suspicion, but the customs of centuries were not so eas-
ily abandoned.  As it turned out—and perhaps partly for reasons of 
geography—the Chief Justice did not serve as important an advisory 
role as President Washington and others may have anticipated.  And 
the experience of losing the services of two Chief Justices for a year 
each because of their appointments as foreign envoys may have dis-
couraged the future appointment of Chief Justices to such offices. 
211 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
212 Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 344, 356 (1797).  It is possible that Wilson 
would also have introduced the use of an opinion of the Court, had he been in a posi-
tion to do so.  Even under Jay, Wilson—acting as the senior Associate Justice because 
Jay and Cushing were both absent—delivered an opinion in United States v. Hamilton 
that, while not labeled an “opinion of the Court” by Dallas, spoke for the Court as a 
whole.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795). 
213 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 36, at 3. 
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But these were still practical rather than constitutional considera-
tions.  As the decade of the 1790s came to a close, there is no indica-
tion that contemporaries believed Chief Justices were prohibited from 
dispensing advice to other branches, when asked, or from holding ex-
trajudicial office.  Nor, despite Ellsworth’s somewhat abortive intro-
duction of the “opinion of the Court,” had the Chief Justice yet come 
to be viewed as the spokesman for or jurisprudential leader of his 
brethren.  Rather, the Chief Justice was still seen as a man who lent 
“dignity” to the Court when he was present,214 but who could be 
plucked from it by the executive—as Ellsworth was in 1799—to lend 
dignity to some other governmental enterprise when it was deemed 
necessary.  Americans had yet to come to the realization that it was 
best for the nation if the Chief Justice remained free to devote his 
time and energies, not to the welfare of the country as a whole, but 
specifically to the Supreme Court. 
 
214 Letter from Jeremiah Smith to William Plumer (Feb. 7, 1795), in 1 DHSC, su-
pra note 2, at 752, 752. 
